Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q4 2014 Letter

Dear Partners and Friends,

PERFORMANCE & PORTFOLIO

Kuroto Fund decreased by -7.3% in the fourth quarter of 2014 and by -7.1% for the full year. By comparison, the MSCI Asia Pacific Index was down -1.4% in the fourth quarter and was up +0.5% for the year. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index fell -4.4% in the fourth quarter and was down -2.0% for the year.[1]

Overall, the losses in the portfolio accelerated meaningfully in the last two months of the year as oil prices collapsed and the U.S. dollar strengthened. Falling oil prices renewed the risk-off sentiment that negatively impacts emerging markets’ stock prices in the short term. It’s worth noting, though, that the overwhelming majority of Kuroto’s investments reside in countries that are net importers of oil. As such, should oil prices remain below previous levels, these countries will experience improved current accounts and lower inflation rates, which should benefit our companies over the longer term. We discussed the strength of the U.S. dollar in the previous letter and it continued to impact the portfolio in Q4. Early this year, we elected to hedge certain currencies where we didn’t have a strong view and the cost wasn’t prohibitive. 


As we discussed in the previous letter, two investments in particular were material detractors from the fund’s performance. One of the holdings, a marketing services company, derives just over half of its revenue from Russia, a country we’ve generally avoided investing in given our preference for benign macro and political environments. However, we believed the strength of the business, its management, and its growth opportunity combined with an already discounted valuation made the investment attractive despite its exposure to Russia. Unfortunately, the situation in Russia deteriorated more dramatically than we had initially expected it to, something which was further compounded by the decline in the oil price. We continue to think the positives of the investment outweigh the negatives of Russia. It’s worth noting that the company’s non-Russian business continues to perform well, and the company is selling for a not-unreasonable multiple of those non-Russian earnings. That being said, we continue to see plenty of value in the Russia business. The position is currently just over 3% of partners’ capital.


The other investment, a provider of temporary power, was hit by a combination of negative events including management turnover, the loss of its largest contract and the failure to win material new business. We had estimated our downside for the investment to be the company’s asset value considering the nature of its business. It now sells for a material discount to that figure. While we think the market has overreacted given the extent of the decline, we certainly overestimated the company’s ability to consistently win new business, and thus, earn an adequate return on its assets. We now consider it to be a good investment given its large discount to very real, saleable assets. Unfortunately, it had to decline dramatically in price to reach this attractiveness. In this case, we clearly failed to do what we do best: accurately estimate a company’s intrinsic value and assess its ability to generate high returns on capital on a consistent basis. The position is presently 5% of partners’ capital due to additional purchases followed by a recent increase in the stock price.


The largest single contributor to our decline on the year was from the fund’s ownership of Japanese government bond interest rate swaps. The position cost the fund 4.4% of partners’ capital on the year. The fund’s long-standing investment in these swaps was based on Japan’s over-indebtedness, fiscal deficits, and more recently, its inflation-targeting monetary policies, all of which, in the long run, are in tension with its very low interest rates. So far, Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda has been willing to let the yen depreciate significantly while keeping interest rates low in an attempt to reach the BoJ’s 2% inflation target. With its second round of stimulus announced last Halloween, the BoJ is now buying more than 100% of some tenors of the incremental issuances of government bonds.[2] The increased asset purchases are also targeting more longer-dated government bonds than the initial program. This has led to a decline in yield for the 30-year bond from 1.6% at the end of October to roughly 1.4% presently (with intervening rates below 1.1%, a rate not seen since the lows of 2003). Kuroto exited this position in November. While we remain skeptical about the sustainability of these policies and still believe the country’s ultra-low interest rates fail to reflect its underlying fundamentals, we will search for shorts that are more aligned with the fund’s expanded mandate.


The fund had positive performance in its Asian investments. India contributed 9.0% to partners’ capital for the year, and the fund’s other investments in Asia contributed 1.0%.


In the fourth quarter, we bought one new position in a Filipino consumer company which we have followed for some time. In addition, we added to several positions during the market sell-off in the quarter, particularly a holding in Vietnam, as well as Aramex, which is detailed in our top-five discussion below.

Top-Five Holdings

As a means of better illustrating our investment process to our partners, we disclose the fund’s top-five companies as of yearend. Since initiating this process in the Q2 2014 letter, three of the fund’s top-five positions have changed. This is due to the new opportunities available to the fund as Kuroto transitions from an Asia-only mandate to a global emerging markets mandate as well as a few company-specific issues. As noted at the time, we exited the fund’s holding in Goodpack as it was in the process of being taken private by KKR—a deal which has since been completed. In addition, we exited the fund’s holdings in Orica. While Orica successfully implemented its planned cost efficiencies and is trying to sell more value-added services, the weakness in the markets for coal and iron ore have forced it to pass on those benefits to their customers, thereby making it a less attractive investment. We also trimmed LG Household & Health preferred shares. The increase in valuation combined with the negative impact on earnings growth from the company’s non-cosmetics businesses have resulted in this being a less compelling investment.

Aramex

Aramex is a domestic and international express delivery company similar to FedEx or DHL. The company was co-founded in 1982 by Fadi Ghandour as a Middle Eastern wholesaler, focused on last-mile delivery for global companies like FedEx that didn’t operate in the region. The company’s reputable brand combined with the “network effect” inherent in its industry form a particularly durable barrier to entry. Aramex further differentiates itself through its ability to operate efficiently in the Middle East, its entrepreneurial culture, and its variable cost structure.


Aramex’s strong market share in its geographies constitutes a meaningful competitive advantage as the same basic cost structure is required to deliver one package or a thousand packages. This dynamic is best characterized as a classic “network effect.”  The company’s well-known brand is also an essential component of its continued success as shipments are often time-sensitive, high-priority items.


The Middle East’s various geopolitical and cultural issues create an additional barrier to entry for outsiders. Aramex is also a local company with local personnel. So it is better equipped to navigate the region’s issues. In addition, the Middle East is a geographically advantaged region. Positioned between Asia and Europe as well as Asia and Africa, a lot of trade destined for other places flows through the region and, thus, through Aramex. 


We also believe the company has a further growth opportunity in e-commerce. Internet access and, consequently, e-commerce are just now taking off in this region of the world. As this happens, Aramex will be delivering more and more online purchases to people’s homes. 


Aramex’s entrepreneurial culture and its flexible business model are further advantages. Local Aramex managers have a great deal of autonomy and a strong incentive to best serve their customers. As opposed to most of its global competitors, Aramex has a variable cost structure. For instance, it doesn’t own planes but instead contracts “belly” space from the airlines. The variable cost structure allows the company’s margins to expand when capacity usage is weak. It also allows Aramex to be loyal to its customers, not to its assets or infrastructure.


Finally, the company has a talented management team that is focused not only on preserving Aramex’s entrepreneurial culture and taking advantage of its growth opportunities but also on thoughtfully allocating capital. Management carefully weighs the tradeoffs between reinvesting in the business, making acquisitions, and returning capital to shareholders. With its high return on equity and discounted valuation of 12.1x estimated 2015 earnings, Aramex is emblematic of the high-quality, undervalued operating businesses that we seek to own in Kuroto.[4] 


Concepcion Industrial Corporation

Concepcion Industrial Corporation (CIC) manufactures and sells air conditioning, refrigeration and elevator products in the Philippines. More specifically, the company has joint ventures with United Technologies for the Carrier air conditioning and the Otis elevator businesses in the Philippines. Air conditioning is the company’s primary business; it was established in 1962 when the Concepcion family became a Carrier licensee. The company’s first-mover advantage in its air conditioning business allowed it to develop a strong brand and service network. We believe those attributes represent barriers to entry, which will allow CIC to capitalize on the growth potential in the country.


Carrier’s dominant market share in the Philippines is in part a result of its strong brand. The company was the first air conditioning brand in the Philippines and has been operating there for over 50 years. Throughout the country’s tumultuous history, many other brands have entered and exited the market but Carrier has been a consistent player over time. This has built up brand loyalty amongst Filipino consumers and allowed Carrier to charge a premium price for its products. Brand also matters in the country because air conditioning is a large investment relative to disposable income and it’s used intensely throughout the year given the hot climate. As such, brands with a reputation for reliability and quality matter. Carrier is CIC’s premium air conditioning brand and the majority of its air conditioning business. It also has the Kelvinator, Toshiba and Condura brands to compete at lower price points.


In addition to its brand advantage, CIC’s differentiation is furthered by its extensive installation and service network. It has over 2,000 technicians, partnerships with 170 installer companies, 130 service centers and 8 dedicated parts stores[5]. Although service is outsourced, the personnel are exclusive to CIC and branded with the Carrier logo. Air conditioning is something that’s difficult to go without once you have it, especially in a country with temperatures as warm as the Philippines. As such, the ability to get a unit repaired and serviced is critical to customers.


CIC has strong growth potential given the low penetration of air conditioning in a country where it could arguably be called a basic necessity. In addition, CIC has further growth opportunities in refrigeration and elevators, which are also underpenetrated in the Philippines. Management aims to double the company’s earnings from 2014 to 2016 and it currently trades at 16x its 2015 estimated earnings[6]. We are also excited about the company’s relationship with United Technologies. Finally, management is quite strong in not only managing the current business but also positioning it for the future. 


Ferreycorp

Ferreycorp, Caterpillar’s exclusive dealer in Peru since 1942, dominates the Peruvian market for mining and construction equipment. The company’s early entry into Peru and its adherence to the Caterpillar business model have led the company to develop a strong service network. We believe this network represents a sustainable competitive advantage which will allow Ferreycorp to profit from Peru’s high, long-term growth. 


Parts and service availability is critical in the mining and construction industries. Maximizing “uptime” is important to profitability since a single broken part can potentially shutter an entire operation. To this end, Ferreycorp has developed an unparalleled service network in Peru.


Ferrycorp’s service dominance is in large part due to its over 70 years of continuous operation in Peru. Its competitors, by comparison, have only been present in the country for a decade or two. As such, Ferreycorp’s service locations and personnel dwarf its closest competitor, Komatsu, and create a particularly strong advantage for the company in the more mountainous parts of Peru. Additionally, the company’s service network makes customers more likely to buy new equipment from Ferreycorp.


The company’s emphasis on service and parts availability follows Caterpillar’s “Seed, Grow, Harvest” business model: plant seeds by selling new equipment; grow the business by developing strong customer relationships; and harvest the profits by replacing parts and performing repairs. The resulting focus on service not only creates customer loyalty but also drives much of the company’s profitability. Parts and service invariably have much higher profitability than a new machine sale. These higher margins also provide insulation from the cyclicality typically associated with selling capital equipment and help generate the high-teens returns on capital necessary to fund the company’s long-term growth.


Ferreycorp clearly benefits from Caterpillar’s “partnership” approach to its distributors as well. Caterpillar recognizes that it benefits from having successful dealers. This enables Ferreycorp to earn high enough returns on capital to further invest in its business which generates more sales for both companies.


We also believe the company has a strong growth opportunity. Peru has 13% of the world’s copper reserves and is one of the lowest cost producers, which should insulate it from the recent weakness in the copper price.[7]  After two years of subpar mining investment, Peru is expected to nearly double its copper production over the next four years, which should result in meaningful new order growth for Ferreycorp.[8]  Despite the aforementioned advantages and growth opportunity, Ferreycorp sells for just 7x 2015 estimated earnings.[9]


HDFC[10] 

HDFC was founded in 1977 with the explicit purpose of enabling homeownership among Indian households, and singlehandedly brought the mortgage to India. Now, almost 40 years later, while the mortgage is no longer a novel concept in India, the market is still very underpenetrated with mortgages only constituting 9% of GDP. This has allowed HDFC to grow its loan book at 20% annually, a rate which should continue into the foreseeable future.


HDFC is uniquely positioned to not only grow its loan book quickly but do so very profitably – with returns on equity in excess of 20%. As a non-bank finance company with an AAA credit rating, HDFC’s term funding has a similar cost to banks, yet it has much lower operating costs than a bank because its branches are specifically targeted towards mortgage lending. HDFC’s assets per employee have quadrupled over the past 15 years, which evidences the efficiency of its branch network. This efficiency has caused the company’s cost-to-income ratio to almost halve, to an extremely low rate of 7.9%. At the same time, HDFC maintains a tight control on risk. Cumulative losses-to-disbursements are only 4 basis points. In addition to its mortgage lending business, HDFC also provides corporate and developer lending, a business which has proven difficult for its competitors. All of these factors combine to allow HDFC to generate high returns on capital while offering a reasonable and competitive offering to its customers. 


HDFC has also diversified its business by sponsoring a bank in 1994, which is now one of the most profitable and well-regarded franchises in India. Separately, its stake in HDFC Standard Life, into which it has contributed 14.4 billion rupees since its founding in 2000, is now worth roughly 10 times the company’s initial investment.[11] Other ventures, including general insurance and asset management, have been similarly successful.


HDFC is currently trading at 14.5x our estimate of the parent company’s March 2016 earnings. We are comfortable maintaining this as a large position at these valuation levels given the combination of the company’s quality and long-term growth prospects.


Larsen & Toubro

Larsen & Toubro (L&T) is an engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) firm based in India. The company can design and build everything from power plants to toll roads to ports and even nuclear submarines. L&T is differentiated through its culture, reputation and vertical integration. These attributes allow the company to have superior project execution and, therefore, should enable it to capitalize on the sizable infrastructure development opportunity within India.


Two Danish engineers founded L&T in the 1930s. As such, it has always been professionally managed, something which is unique among Indian corporations, which are typically family owned and operated. Professional management has allowed L&T to attract high-quality talent in what is very much a people business. Unlike most companies in India, a young engineer can join the company after graduating from college and potentially one day become its CEO. L&T’s professionalization has also enabled it to develop a strong corporate culture that emphasizes quality and honesty. All of this matters in an industry where completing a project on-time and at-cost is a customer’s key objective. India is a difficult place to do business and customers are often willing to pay a premium for L&T services. 


The company is further able to differentiate itself through its vertical integration. Unlike most EPC businesses, L&T manufactures, constructs, and installs a lot of what it designs. India does not have a well-developed supplier base and labor is difficult to manage in the country. The company does a lot of manufacturing and fabrication, making things such as boilers, turbines and power equipment. As an example, L&T has nearly 55,000 employees while Samsung Engineering—a similar-sized company—has just 8,500.[12] The company has said that most EPC companies outsource a majority of a project while L&T insources most of it. Being vertically integrated again allows L&T to finish projects on-time and at-cost, thus enabling it to have superior execution versus its competitors.


The company’s exceptional management team has also allowed it to identify new areas of growth and participate in a variety of business verticals. Management describes L&T as “builders to the nation.” While infrastructure projects comprise the vast majority of L&T’s business, the company is pursuing opportunities in defense, realty, and nuclear power plants among other things.


Excluding the values of its subsidiaries, we estimate that L&T’s core EPC business sells for 15.9x its 2015 estimated earnings. We believe the company’s EPC earnings have the potential to grow meaningfully over the next few years as long as India’s new government restarts the country’s investment cycle. For reference, excluding L&T, EPC orders in India have declined by 44% since 2010.[13] Furthermore, the country’s annualized gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) to nominal GDP ratio has fallen from a peak of 33.3% in Q3 2008 to a nine-year low of 28.3% in Q1 2014 and Q2 2014.[14]



Sincerely,


Andrew Ewert

Sean Fieler                   

Daniel Gittes

William W. Strong 

ENDNOTES

[1] Performance contribution as stated uses the fund’s dollar-weighted gross internal rate of return calculations derived from average capital and sector P&L. Sector performance figures are derived using monthly performance contribution calculations in US dollars, gross of all fees and fund expenses. Interest rate swaps are included in Fixed Income. Yen puts are netted against long contribution in Asia (ex-India) sector. P&L on bullion, cash, and currency forwards are excluded from the table.


[2] Based on October 31, 2014 Bank of Japan memorandum, “Outline of Outright Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds.”


[3] Valuations as of 1.13.2015. Top holdings as of 12.31.14. Estimates derived from internal models. L&T and HDFC: parent company PE and ROE adjusted for subsidiaries.  Compound annual return based on monthly gross IRR.


[4] Metrics derived from internal proprietary company model and based on 2015 estimated earnings.


[5] 2014 Company presentation.


[6] Company presentations.


[7] Wood Mackenzie.


[8] Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mining.


[9] Valuations derived from internal models.


[10] All data presented from company presentation.


[11] Based on December, 2014 third party investment in HDFC insurance business. 


[12] From respective company presentations.


[13] Source: Axis Capital.


[14] Source: CEIC Data, Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation.

By Dan Donohue May 1, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. rose +23.4% in the first quarter of 2025. Over the same period the price of gold rose +18.9%. The fund’s performance was driven by strong returns from both the producing and exploration stage companies as gold crossed $3,000 per ounce. Trump's New Economic Policy Trump’s New Economic Policy has roiled markets and bolstered investor gold buying globally. While the violent market gyrations remain a focus for our team, we have also been thinking through the long-term effects of Trump’s policies. In this latter endeavor, Nixon’s 1971 New Economic Policy has proven an invaluable guide. The policy similarities between Nixon’s first term and Trump’s second are striking. Both presidents declared emergencies, raised tariffs, cut spending, reduced foreign aid, blamed foreigners, devalued the dollar , proposed tax cuts, attacked the Federal Reserve chair, and directly managed consumer prices. There are, of course, also meaningful differences. Most notably, Trump has raised tariffs more, devalued the dollar less, and has not imposed formal wage and price controls. Nevertheless, the policy resonance is striking.
By Kieran Brennan April 30, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund, L.P. appreciated +7.3% in the first quarter of 2025, while the broad MSCI Emerging Markets index rose +3.0%. Kuroto performance for the quarter was driven primarily by the strong performance of our operating companies in Georgia and Ghana. A breakdown of Kuroto Fund exposures can be found here . Returning to Brazil Though the Kuroto Fund didn’t invest outside of Asia until 2014, as a firm we began investing in Brazil in the late 1990s and made our first sizable investment there in 2004. We have followed the market ever since. Given our love for the country of Brazil and admiration for many of the companies there, it has been challenging for us to remain mostly absent from Brazilian capital markets for the past decade. We stayed away for a variety of reasons, but primarily because we didn’t like the valuations on offer. So it is with more than a bit of enthusiasm that we were able to make two substantial investments in Brazil this January, taking our portfolio weighting in the country from 0% to 10%. Brazil remains a macroeconomic and political adventure, but today’s valuations are incredibly attractive. The Brazilian stock market is down over 40% in US dollars over the past 14 years. 
By Kieran Brennan April 29, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. rose +11.0% net of fees in the first quarter of 2025. Over the same period, the S&P 500 index declined -4.3%. Equinox’s performance was driven by the strength of our gold mining equity portfolio, most notably by our earlier stage exploration companies that rose dramatically as gold crossed $3,000 per ounce. Trump's new economic Policy As Trump’s New Economic Policy roiled markets, we selectively harvested short positions and increased our ownership in oil and gas companies at deeply discounted prices. Violent market gyrations remain a focus, but we have also been thinking through the long-term effects of Trump’s policies. In this latter endeavor, Nixon’s 1971 New Economic Policy has proven an invaluable guide. The policy similarities between Nixon’s first term and Trump’s second are striking. Both presidents declared emergencies, raised tariffs, cut spending, reduced foreign aid, blamed foreigners, devalued the dollar, proposed tax cuts, attacked the Federal Reserve chair, and directly managed consumer prices. There are, of course, also meaningful differences. Most notably, Trump has raised tariffs more, devalued the dollar less, and has not imposed formal wage and price controls. Nevertheless, the policy resonance is striking.
By Kieran Brennan April 8, 2025
Webinar Replay of Case Study presentation on Solidcore Resources
By Kieran Brennan February 26, 2025
Payne Points of Wealth Podcast - "The revenge of Inflation and Kazakhstan"
By Kieran Brennan January 18, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. fell -12.9% in the fourth quarter, finishing the year down – 2.9%. The fund’s performance reflects the lackluster performance of the gold mining sector as well as the underperformance of the companies we own. While there were some clear themes, such as producing companies outperforming exploration companies, our 2024 results are most accurately captured through a description of our six best and six worst performing investments during the year. These twelve companies capture every investment that contributed at least 1%, positive or negative, to our 2024 fund performance. A Challenging Year In 2024, the gold price finished up +27.4%. The GDXJ ETF which tracks the index of junior gold mining producers was up +15.7%. Our portfolio of miners in this fund was down -2.9%. The underperformance of the gold miners as compared to gold largely reflects government participation in the gold market. In 2024, governments bought gold, not gold miners. The poor performance of the gold miners also reflects the sector’s continued subpar returns on capital. The S&P TSX Global Gold universe, a group of large, mature gold miners, only generated an 11% ROE in 2024 and a 5.4% free cash flow yield according to RBC. Despite their inadequate returns on capital, producing miners handily outperformed most exploration and development companies. There remains almost no market for most gold mining companies that are years away from first production. As value investors with contrarian instincts, we have found the increasingly irrational valuations of the pre-revenue companies of particular interest. Often as a project advances, the equity market value of the company declines. These share price declines in turn create a self-reinforcing dynamic in which the small, cash-starved companies underperform because they don’t have access to the capital necessary to move their projects forward. At this point, the downward spiral of pre-revenue gold miners is very extended and nearing a floor in our opinion. Not only are the valuations of these companies incredibly low, but these companies have become increasingly attractive acquisition targets. Although exploration companies are the most severely discounted sector, 54% of our fund remains invested in producing companies. In general, our producing companies trade at a discount to the sector because they are executing on significant capex plans and lack free cash flow. During construction periods, the market can become excessively skeptical. This skepticism, in turn, can present an opportunity to buy high quality assets run by good management teams at attractive valuations. We believe that this is clearly the case at Eldorado Gold, K92 Mining, West African Resources and Adriatic Metals. Overall, our miners are incredibly cheap. Assuming a flat gold price, we estimate our producers will generate a 23.5% IRR. Our companies that do not yet generate any cash flow are cheaper still. Ascot, Thesis, Troilus and Goldquest, for example, have an average IRR of over 30% at current metals prices. Six Winners and Six Losers in 2024 Note: Below IRR is our Equinox internally calculated IRR based on 2024 year-end market prices and forecasted future FCF per share to equity. Borealis Mining: 2024 Performance +29%, IRR 48% Borealis was founded by Kelly Malcolm in 2023 to leverage a large heap leach facility in Nevada by acquiring nearby low-grade heap leach assets. We invested in a pre-IPO round at a $30M post-money valuation. At the time, Borealis had approx. $5M worth of crushed stockpiles, a fully permitted heap leach facility, ~60,000oz of reserves ready to be processed with limited capex and substantial exploration potential at depth. In late 2024, Borealis began to acquire nearby deposits. Borealis purchased Bull Run for $6M in cash. This translates to $14 per ounce for ~500,000oz of already defined resources, and confirms managements intuition that there are small, stranded assets for sale in Nevada. We expect Borealis to continue this acquisition strategy and ramp to become a ~75,000 oz per year producer. K92 Mining: 2024 Performance +22%, IRR 17% K92 controls the world-class Kainantu mine in the highlands of Papua New Guinea. This mine is a high-grade, low-cost asset with a 3 million oz resource at 7g/t. K92 produced 120,000 oz last year, and we expect the company’s Phase 3 expansion will take annual production to over 150,000 oz (gold equivalent) in 2025. While K92 has often struggled to meet its ambitious growth targets, the company has strung together two consecutive quarters of meaningfully higher production with higher than reserve grades. K92 recently expanded the milling capacity which had been a meaningful bottleneck for years. If the company can reach Phase 4, the Kainantu mine’s production will produce ~400,000 oz at a bottom quartile cash cost of <$1000/oz while maintaining a clean balance sheet with minimal leverage. West African Resources: 2024 Performance +38%, IRR 31% In 2024, West African Resources (WAF) remained on-time and on budget in the build of the company’s second mine in Burkina Faso, called Kiaka. Once Kiaka is commissioned in Q3 2025, WAF will be a ~450,000 oz annual producer for the next 10 years. While the construction has proceeded as expected, WAF was adversely impacted by the local content language in Burkina Faso’s new mining code. Rather than pay the resulting mark up in their rental of local equipment, WAF elected to purchase their mining fleet outright. This decision added $150 million to the company’s capital budget and resulted in a July equity raise of the same amount. While we were disappointed with the need for more equity capital, ultimately the raise will accelerate WAF’s buy-back and dividend plans. If the company continues to trade at the current valuation, we expect the board will announce a sizable share repurchase as soon as the company’s debt is repaid. Hochschild Mining: 2024 Performance +96%, IRR 18% Hochschild Mining (HOC) is a proven mine builder with the strategy of reinvesting free cash flow into new projects to grow production. In 2024, we visited their newly commissioned mine in Brazil, called Mara Rosa, which was successfully built on time and on budget. Mara Rosa will deliver a 20%+ project level IRR and highlights HOC's competence in executing medium-size projects in Latin America. We expect the company will be able to repeat this success with another mine in Brazil, the Monte Do Carmo project in the neighboring state of Tocantins. Big picture, HOC is a family-owned business with a goal of producing 500,000 ounces of gold per year by 2030. While we would prefer a return on capital goal rather than a growth target, we appreciate the straight-forward way the company organizes its operations, and we believe the company will not undertake projects with less than a 20% cash on cash IRR. Moreover, unlike many growth miners, when the company reaches their targeted 500,000 ounces of annual production – anticipated for 2030 - we expect HOC to transition to return free cash flow to shareholders. Galiano Gold: 2024 Performance +35%, IRR 29% Galiano has been busily working on a new mine plan which will be released on January 28th. We expect the company’s production guidance will increase as Galiano elects to move forward with the redevelopment of their higher grade Nkran pit. We also expect increased exploration spending in 2025 as the company ramps up work on their newly consolidated land package. We are expecting Galiano to guide to a production target of approx. 250,000 ounces per year by 2027. Even at this higher rate of production, we anticipate the company will be able to more than replace reserves given the prospectivity of the Asankrangwa gold belt in which they operate. While Galiano will have to reinvest the vast majority of its cash flow in growth in 2025 and 2026, the company should become a substantial free cash flow generator beginning in 2027. Solidcore Resources: 2024 Performance +22%, IRR 21% Solidcore, a spin-out from Polymetal, is a new position in our fund. Solidcore is run by CEO Vitaly Nesis, and controlled by Oman’s sovereign wealth fund. The company operates two long-lived mines in Kazakhstan and produces 480,000 ounces of gold annually at a competitive All-In Sustaining Cost (AISC) of $1,300/oz. With an EV/EBITDA multiple of 2.2x, Solidcore trades at an almost 50% discount to its peers. This undervaluation is largely due to the company’s sole listing on the Astana International Exchange in Kazakhstan. We expect Solidcore to generate roughly $400 million in free cash flow per year at current gold prices. In 2025 and 2026, this free cash flow will be invested in a new pressure oxidation autoclave. Beginning in 2027, we anticipate that $100 million USD of the company’s free cash flow will be distributed to shareholders. This prospective dividend along with the company’s plan to re-list on the London Stock Exchange offers two catalysts that should drive a significant re-rating. Orezone Gold: 2024 Performance -30%, IRR 27% While Orezone completed its initial build on time and on budget, the company failed to generate the free cash flow necessary to internally finance the expansion of its operations in Burkina Faso. The company’s reliance on high-cost diesel generators and an unreliable power grid proved particularly problematic. Largely due to higher-than-expected power costs, the midpoint of their AISC guidance increased by $100/oz from last year’s projection of $1,338/oz. Despite the elevated power costs, Orezone successfully closed their financing for the hard rock processing plant in December 2024. This financing will enable Orezone to increase annual production from approx. 120,000 oz in 2024 to ~180,000 oz in 2026. We expect 2025 to be a pivotal year for the company as they will begin to generate sufficient cash to pay down debt and continue building towards their 250,000 oz/year target. We are also encouraged by the company’s ongoing exploration program which has the potential to increase the Bombore’s mine life at higher grades. C3 Metals: 2024 Performance -62% C3 stock declined significantly in 2024 even as the company made significant progress advancing their projects in both Jamaica and Peru. With respect to their Jamaican asset, C3 Metals signed a joint venture agreement with the Stewart family, one of the wealthiest families on the island. C3 is now well-positioned to do a JV deal with a larger international mining company that can finance the costly deep holes necessary to test the porphyry copper deposit’s potential. In Peru, C3 Metals received a permit to access one of its land packages located just 40 kilometers east of MMG’s Las Bambas mine. This permit, which took years to secure, opens the door for further exploration in a proven copper-rich region. With the permit in hand, C3 Metals should be able to bring in a larger partner to drill out the asset. Troilus Gold: 2024 Performance -45%, IRR 35% In May 2024, Troilus submitted its feasibility study to the Canadian government. This new study detailed their plan to develop a 22-year open pit mine that would produce approx. 300,000 oz of gold per year. With current gold prices north of $2,600 and copper hovering around $4, the project will likely move forward. The company has received financial support from a handful of export credit agencies interested in its 10% copper production. Troilus is also in the final stages of submitting the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (“ESIA”), another key milestone as they advance towards construction. Located 300 kilometers north of Chibougamau, Quebec, the Troilus project is a brownfield site in a favorable mining jurisdiction with the potential to become a Top 10 copper gold project in Canada. We are fans of CEO Justin Reid and believe in his ability to permit the project and advance it towards becoming a premier North American copper-gold producer. At a $4/oz equity market cap to gold equivalent ounces in ground ratio, we believe Troilus is one of Canada’s best leveraged investments to rising gold and copper prices. Ascot Resources: 2024 Performance -23%, IRR 38% Ascot Resources put its Premier gold project on care & maintenance in September of 2024. At the time, the company didn’t have enough ore coming from the underground mine to profitably operate the 2,500 tonnes per day mill. To rectify the lack of available ore, the company raised $43 million, extended the term of their debt, and decided to invest in an additional 2,500 meters of development before commissioning the mill. The board then made a change at CEO and brought in Jim Currie for his extensive underground mining experience and added our own Coille Van Alphen to the board. Underground development is currently underway, and we expect the mill to restart in Q2 2025. One more injection of capital will likely be required to ensure the company has a sufficient working capital buffer as they restart the mill. When the mine reaches commercial production, it will be able to generate a sustainable ~$100m of FCF per year which should translate into a stock price of at least $1 CAD per share. Great Pacific Gold: 2024 Performance -47% Great Pacific owns two highly prospective gold exploration projects in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Over the course of 2024, the company refined its exploration targets and drilled 5000m at its Kesar project in the highlands of PNG. The Kesar project looks to be an extension of nearby K92’s mine, and as such may be sold to K92. Great Pacific will begin drilling exploration targets at its second PNG property in Q2 of 2025. This property is a brownfield site with past production at a grade of more than 10 g/t. Great Pacific has a third asset in Australia, which we believe could be sold to fund the company’s exploration activities in PNG. Great Pacific is led by an excellent CEO in Greg McCunn. We got to know Greg through a previous investment in West Africa. As CEO, he brings the necessary vision, discipline, and accountability to an exploration company. We believe the company will deliver exploration success at their two PNG assets and ultimately enable Greg to create shareholder value in a variety of ways. GoGold Resources: 2024 Performance -24%, IRR 30% GoGold has been waiting two years for its permit in Mexico. The delay was caused by the previous Mexican President Andres Manual Lopez Obrador’s (AMLO) staunch opposition to new mining development. In the end, while neither of AMLO’s major proposed changes to the mining code passed, few mining permits of any kind were issued during his time in office. GoGold’s large cash buffer and existing heap leach operation enabled the company to wait out AMLO without needing to raise additional equity capital. We think their patience will soon be rewarded as the new administration of President Claudia Sheinbaum plans to process permit applications on their technical merits. In GoGold’s case, the technical merits of their Los Ricos South project are exceptionally strong with over 100 million oz of silver at an average grade of 276 g/t. Sincerely, Equinox Partners Investment Management
By Kieran Brennan January 17, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. declined -6.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024, finishing the calendar year 2024 up +17.7% net of all fees. Our poor performance in the fourth quarter was driven by a sharp selloff in gold and silver miners despite a flat gold price during the period. 2024 Year in Review Crew Energy accounted for 100% of our fund’s performance in 2024. We offered a fulsome write-up of Crew in our third quarter letter and need not repeat the details of the acquisition by Tourmaline here, other than to note that the 72% premium resulted in an ~18% contribution to the fund’s total return. While there was significant movement among our other investments, their aggregate contribution was close to zero. This is a disappointing result given the significant progress many of our companies made last year. The market was not impressed by Paramount Resources’ sale of its core asset to Ovintiv for $3.3bn CAD. Nor did the market seem to care that Kosmos energy finally brought its flagship Tortue asset online in December. Thesis Gold’s positive feasibility study elicited an initial positive reaction, which was quickly reversed. Elsewhere, the market remains totally indifferent to the rapid progress that West African Resources is making at their Kiaka asset. While we understand that our sectors are out of favor, we would hope to see at least some of the value they are creating reflected in their stock prices in 2025. We’ve been busy over the past six months, establishing several sizable, new positions. We sold half of the Tourmaline shares we received in consideration for our Crew shares and used funds to make the following investments: an 11% portfolio weight in Solidcore Resources, an 8% position in Kosmos Energy, a 5% weighting in Ensign Energy, and a 5% weight in Gran Tierra Energy. Solidcore and Kosmos are both top five positions and receive a full writeup in the letter that follows. Ensign Energy is a North American energy service company, and Gran Tierra Energy is an E&P company with assets in Latin America and Canada. Both Ensign and Gran Tierra trade at particularly compelling valuations. investment Thesis Review for our top 5 Long Positions by Weight
By Kieran Brennan January 17, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund, L.P. appreciated +6.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and finished the year up +11.1%. Performance for the quarter was driven primarily by the positive performance our operating company holdings in Nigeria, Ghana, and Georgia. A breakdown of Kuroto Fund exposures can be found here . 2024 Year in Review Kuroto’s top five investments made large strides last year. Seplat completed its ExxonMobil Nigeria acquisition, more than doubling its production, cash flow and reserves. Georgia Capital successfully sold a non-core asset and is in a good position to buy back a lot of stock this year. MTN Ghana saw strong operational performance while Ghana’s economy and currency stabilized. Guaranty Trust Bank completed a government-mandated equity raise, and Nigeria made steps towards stabilizing its economy. Lastly, Kosmos brought on its long-delayed Tortue LNG project. In each case, we believe the market has not adequately factored in the progress our companies have made, and we anticipate a more fulsome rerating of our top holdings in 2025.
By Kieran Brennan November 1, 2024
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. rose +3.1% in the third quarter and is up +11.0% through the end of September 2024. Performance for the quarter was driven primarily by our group of explorers, with additional positive contribution coming from the producing segment of the portfolio. These gains were partially offset by the decline of one of our development stage companies which has experienced delays and raised additional capital. As our gold miners have lagged the indices, a substantial valuation gap has opened between the largest gold miners in the industry and the producing companies we own. At spot pricing, consensus sell-side models have Agnico, Barrick, Kinross and Newmont delivering an IRR of just 3%. Our portfolio of producers, on the other hand, models out to an IRR of 20% using the same metals price assumptions. There's substantial value in the gold mining sector, but the largest companies are not the ones to own.
More Posts