Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q3 2008 Letter
Dear Partners and Friends,
Asian Crisis Valuations, Almost
While the companies we own in Asia are not as cheap as they were during the depths of the Asia Crisis, they are pretty close. Whether the comparison is made on an earnings or book value basis, the numbers tell the same story. On a forward earnings basis, our companies are approximately 30% more expensive than they were at year-end 1998. And, on a current year book value basis, they are 5% less expensive.
Kuroto’s Look‐Through Valuations
1999
2009
P/E
4.1
5.3
Div Yield
6.7%
5.6%
P/B
0.69
0.66
The first thing to point out concerning our portfolio’s 2009 earnings multiple is that it assumes our companies will actually grow their earnings next year. This growth in earnings is not, however, reflective of our wild optimism about the prospective earnings power of the businesses we own. The simple elimination of non-recurring losses accounts for the majority of the estimated improvement. That said, it should be noted that the companies we own are, on the whole, still growing.
While our portfolio’s five point three times earnings multiple is close to the fund’s Asia Crisis levels, these two ratios are not directly comparable. The 2009 earnings of our companies will not be as compressed as they were in 1999, in large part, because the economic environment in Asia will not as bad as it was then. This is both good and bad news. The bad news is that our companies aren’t going to see a huge rebound in earnings in the coming years. The good news is that our companies are continuing to grow earnings, a feat which is possible because most Asian economies, unlike the US economy, are not in recession.
Book value, which does not require the same imperfect estimation process as forward earnings, corroborates the attractive valuations of the companies we own. The companies we own are trading at two-thirds of book and are much better capitalized than they were ten years ago. The debt to equity of our non-financial companies is 0.19 vs. 0.29 ten years ago. The financial strength of our companies highlights the deleveraging that has occurred across Asia over the past decade. The level of indebtedness as a percentage of GDP in the markets we are invested in is also much lower than that of the “safe-haven” of the world, the US.
In focusing on the comparative valuation of our companies today vs. ten years ago, we aren’t capturing the fact that the businesses we own today are much better than they were ten years ago: they have better managements, and they face less government policy risk. In 1998, 45% of our portfolio was invested in extremely cheap companies with managements that had a pattern of less than perfect behavior. Now, our businesses are much stronger with respect to management quality. Also, ten years ago, Asian governments were intervening in their banking systems and markets, creating an unpredictable environment driven by government actions. Today, Asia is clearly demonstrating its solid commitment to free markets and showing a willingness to maintain that course in a way that is lacking in the West.
While the companies we own in Asia are not as cheap as they were during the depths of the Asia Crisis, they are pretty close. Whether the comparison is made on an earnings or book value basis, the numbers tell the same story. On a forward earnings basis, our companies are approximately 30% more expensive than they were at year-end 1998. And, on a current year book value basis, they are 5% less expensive.
Kuroto’s Look‐Through Valuations
1999 2009
P/E 4.1 5.3
Div Yield 6.7% 5.6%
P/B 0.69 0.66
The first thing to point out concerning our portfolio’s 2009 earnings multiple is that it assumes our companies will actually grow their earnings next year. This growth in earnings is not, however, reflective of our wild optimism about the prospective earnings power of the businesses we own. The simple elimination of non-recurring losses accounts for the majority of the estimated improvement. That said, it should be noted that the companies we own are, on the whole, still growing.
While our portfolio’s five point three times earnings multiple is close to the fund’s Asia Crisis levels, these two ratios are not directly comparable. The 2009 earnings of our companies will not be as compressed as they were in 1999, in large part, because the economic environment in Asia will not as bad as it was then. This is both good and bad news. The bad news is that our companies aren’t going to see a huge rebound in earnings in the coming years. The good news is that our companies are continuing to grow earnings, a feat which is possible because most Asian economies, unlike the US economy, are not in recession.
Book value, which does not require the same imperfect estimation process as forward earnings, corroborates the attractive valuations of the companies we own. The companies we own are trading at two-thirds of book and are much better capitalized than they were ten years ago. The debt to equity of our non-financial companies is 0.19 vs. 0.29 ten years ago. The financial strength of our companies highlights the deleveraging that has occurred across Asia over the past decade. The level of indebtedness as a percentage of GDP in the markets we are invested in is also much lower than that of the “safe-haven” of the world, the US.
In focusing on the comparative valuation of our companies today vs. ten years ago, we aren’t capturing the fact that the businesses we own today are much better than they were ten years ago: they have better managements, and they face less government policy risk. In 1998, 45% of our portfolio was invested in extremely cheap companies with managements that had a pattern of less than perfect behavior. Now, our businesses are much stronger with respect to management quality. Also, ten years ago, Asian governments were intervening in their banking systems and markets, creating an unpredictable environment driven by government actions. Today, Asia is clearly demonstrating its solid commitment to free markets and showing a willingness to maintain that course in a way that is lacking in the West.
Sincerely,
Sean Fieler
William W. Strong










