Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q4 2008 Letter
Dear Partners and Friends,
Our Asian Banks
Kuroto Fund’s twenty-seven percent weighting in bank stocks has raised more than a few eyebrows and questions of late. The questions, invariably posed with a bit of incredulity, typically go something like this: how can Asian banks possibly be safe investments at a time when so many American and European banks are insolvent? The answer is as obvious as the question. Asian banks, particularly the ones we own, aren’t anywhere close to bankrupt. They are, instead, well capitalized and nicely profitable. Consequently, rather than lobbying for massive taxpayer bailouts and holding on for a miraculous rise in prices, classic insolvent bank behavior, our Asian banks are actually trying to ascertain the true value of their assets, classic solvent bank behavior. That the stock market has punted and opted to value our banks at distressed levels makes them spectacular investments and is the reason we are so heavily weighted in the sector.
To be clear, our confidence in the Asian banks we own is not a product of our having our head in the sand. We are acutely aware that credit conditions in the region have only started to deteriorate and that the current rise in provisions is just the first chapter in a much longer story. Surely, reported asset quality will worsen for some time to come.[1] We further understand that this particular downturn will bring new challenges to Asia’s financial system, challenges not seen even in the depths of the Asia crisis. While the usual suspect sectors, real-estate, small business loans, and cyclicals, will each cause their share of problems, Asia’s export sector will likely prove to be a sizable new source of non-performing loans during this downturn.
The solidity of our Asian banks is best shown through a discussion of the two principal threats to the financial health of any bank, insolvency and illiquidity. Because insolvent banks always claim to only have a liquidity problem, these two concepts are often confused. So to clarify, US banks have a solvency problem: their liabilities are significantly greater than their assets. US banks claim, however, that they have a liquidity problem: they can’t sell their assets at “true” value today. While our Asian banks have neither a solvency nor a liquidity problem, we will discuss each in turn.
In terms of solvency, the key ratio to focus on is a bank’s tangible equity to tangible assets. Over the past decade, Kuroto’s financials have maintained this ratio at 10%, a level consistent with the long-term historic norms of the banking industry. By contrast, the top five US financials had at year-end a tangible equity to asset ratio of just 1.8%, an already inadequate level that has certainly worsened during the first quarter’s deflationary environment.
[1] It typically takes solvent bank two years to fully recognize non-performing loans. Insolvent banks invariably take much longer.
The strong liquidity position of our banks, a topic less often discussed but as important as solvency, is best described through a few examples. HDFC and Bunas Finance, two Asian lenders we own, typify the conservatism of our lenders’ liquidity management. Bunas Finance, an Indonesian auto finance company trading at forty percent of book, has opted for the totally bullet-proof and most infrequently chosen solution. The duration of their assets is cumulatively at every monthly interval shorter than the duration of their liabilities. This is a balance sheet strategy you almost never see in a spread lending business because it structurally reduces profitability. It does, however, have its benefits in a stress test. If Bunas Finance never makes another loan, their business will liquidate naturally, a process which, incidentally, they are voluntarily accelerating by buying back some of their debt at very attractive yields. That Bunas can carry an asset sensitive book and still generate a twenty percent plus return on equity while only leveraging their balance sheet three to one, speaks volumes to the quality of their franchise.
India’s HDFC, another one of our favorite Asian lenders, has simply matched the duration of their assets and liabilities. While not quite as conservative as Bunas Finance’s strategy, in that HDFC’s liquidity position depends on the timely performance of nearly all their assets, this approach seems reasonable to us given the historic strength of HDFC’s underwriting process. After all, HDFC has lost a mere four basis points on the total quantity of credit they have extended since they first opened their doors for business in 1977! The chart below illustrates the maturity profile of HDFC’s assets and liabilities.
The conservative approach to solvency and liquidity of HDFC and Bunas Finance highlights a larger truth about South and South East Asian banking. It has only been a decade or so since most every lender in the region was bankrupt. Having had that unpleasant experience seared into their brain, the region’s bankers didn’t get carried away in the last few years, and they certainly never bought into the myth of AAA ratings that has ravaged the developed world’s financial system. They never forgot that lending entails risk, and must be underwritten and priced as such. They also didn’t develop derivative books. Finally and most importantly, they retained an appreciation of their own fallibility, always keeping significant tier one capital on hand in case some of the asset they were carrying weren’t worth exactly what they thought they were worth.
Kuroto Fund, once again, finds itself comfortable with a meaningfully contrarian position. Our Asian lenders are valued as if they were part and parcel of the ongoing banking crisis in New York or London. We, however, are confident they embody very modest risk with a likely huge reward over time. To quantify the opportunity: our Asian banks are on average at 60% of book and four times earnings, generating double digit returns on equity in a difficult environment, and continuing to grow. We fully expect to make multiples of our money on this investment when the market concludes that these financial franchises are here to stay.
Sincerely,
Sean Fieler
William W. Strong









