Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q3 2011 Letter
Dear Partners and Friends,
PERFORMANCE & PORTFOLIO
Kuroto Fund rose +10.1% in the quarter ended September 30,
2012. After gains in October and in November, the fund was up +19.6% for the year to date through November 30th. This compares to the MSCI Asia Pacific index which was up +12.7% during the same period.
Downgrade!
“… [T]he downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability and predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges… The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.”
—S&P announcement of US debt downgrade August 5, 2011
With these fateful words, Standard & Poor’s Corporation announced the fall of the world’s reserve currency from “risk-free” grace. Thus, America joins a growing list of developed countries whose government balance sheets are being called into question. A recent Bank for International Settlement working paper sums up the well known reasons for the rash of developed country downgrades:
“Since the start of the financial crisis, industrial country public debt levels have increased dramatically. And they are set to continue rising for the foreseeable future. A number of countries face the prospect of large and rising future costs related to the ageing of their population… Our projections of public debt ratios lead us to conclude that the path pursued by fiscal authorities in a number of industrial countries is unsustainable.”[1]
If history is any guide, so long as financing costs of government debt remain low, any effort to rouse the requisite political will to reverse the process will fail. This outcome is unfortunate for Japan because that country’s low-cost financing contradicts potential proximity of a debt crisis. In quick succession, investors’ concern about credit quality could translate into higher interest rates and those higher rates would in turn exacerbate the very problem investors are worried about by increasing government interest expenses.
Japan continues to benefit from a major, and we believe temporary, distinction that bond investors are making between financially-stretched nations with government printing presses and those without. The former, such as Japan, have seen their interest rates stay low or even decline as worried investors flee countries that lack a printing press. But, while central bank printing may be able to prevent a bad bond auction, it is no panacea. After all, the newly printed money is highly inflationary and in the medium term at least as bond bearish as a failed auction.
Japanese Government Bonds Short
In recent years we have ramped-up our Japanese Government Bond (JGB) short—a position we initiated in 2003. As of November 30, the position is 45% of partners’ capital.[2] Our investment rationale is as compelling as it is simple: As bond yields collapsed in the aftermath of the 2008 Credit Crisis, and government deficits exploded, the asymmetry of risk and reward with this short became extremely positive (please also see our Q3 2009 letter on this topic in addition to the Equinox Partners Q2 2003 letter, which we’d be pleased to send you). While we have been early, it is our judgment that we dare not miss such a lopsidedly attractive investment opportunity.
“A Bug in Search of a Windshield,” is the colorful metaphor that John Mauldin and Jonathan Tepper use to describe the credit condition of Japanese Government Bonds. With over 200% government gross debt/GDP, developed over their 20 years of Keynesian spending to compensate for economic weakness, and government spending still more than double tax receipts, Japan is by far and away the most indebted sovereign. Ironically, Japan also has the lowest interest rates in the developed world in the face of massive fiscal deficits. This combination makes JGBs a particularly compelling short.
In addition to their very high price, there are two particularly attractive aspects of shorting JGBs. The first is the reflexivity referenced above. As Kyle Bass—a fellow JGB short seller—points out, a mere 2 percent increase in the extremely low JGB interest rates, would mean that, “their debt service alone could easily exceed their entire central government revenue—checkmate.”[3] In addition to this potentially expensive reflexivity, their previously abundant source of cash inflows is drying up rapidly. The high savings rate of its population that was a hallmark of Japan’s development is collapsing as the aging population retires (graph below).[4] Given the asymmetric nature of this investment—and choosing two scenarios we feel have similar probabilities—if the JGB yield curve were to drop -0.5% across the curve we would stand to lose -$38m, while if the curve increased +5.0% we would make +$100m.[5] And with the low annual carry cost of about 0.5% of partners’ capital, we have time to wait.
Sincerely,
Sean Fieler
Daniel Gittes
William W. Strong
ENDNOTES
[1] Steven G. Cecchetti, MS Mohanty, Fabrizio Zampolli, “The Future of Public Debt: Prospects and Implications,” Abstract of BIS Working Paper No. 300, March 2010.
[2] Stated percentage is the notional amount of JGB swaps as a percentage of partners’ capital.
[3] Hayman Capital Management, L.P. Investor Letter, “The Cognitive Dissonance of It All”, February 14, 2011.
[4] Dependency ratio shows the number of non-workers per 100 workers.
[5] This does not factor in possible Yen currency devaluation which would likely offset some of the gains or losses.










