Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q3 2002 Letter
Dear Partners and Friends,
Japan’s “Investor of Last Resort”
“We need to find the reason stocks are declining, and then decide what to do.” So stated Japan’s Finance Minister Masajuro Shiokawa this summer, twelve years and seventy-five percent from the Nikkei’s peak. Choosing to wait no longer, in September, the Bank of Japan announced a stunning new policy. To stem the erosion of Japanese banks’ capital from the continuing decline of their equity portfolios (one among several declines eroding their capital), central banker Masaru Hayami proposed that his bank buy shares from the commercial banks’ portfolios. In other words, to maintain the fiction that Japan’s banks are adequately capitalized, the Bank of Japan is to become, to use the Financial Times phrase, “the investor of last resort.”
Government support of stock prices is not a new development in Asia. However, it is a symptom of Japan’s reflationary desperation that it intends to use its central bank to accomplish this goal. Such an action is unique in monetary history. For the first time, the only government entity which pays for assets by “creating money” is going to use that process to purchase corporate equities in the public stock market. Obviously, the numerous implications of this precedent setting change are very important—both for Japan and the rest of the deflationary world. As one pundit put it, “the BoJ is pursuing the hari-kari option by sacrificing its own credibility.”
The Bank of Japan’s radical new appetite for stocks has a second, deeper purpose—“the central bank is trying to shock the government and banks into action in a last ditch gamble to avert a crisis,” says the Financial Times. What one Japanese official described as a, “meaningful wake-up call,” was apparently heeded to the extent that it underlay the recent appointment of reformer Heizo Takenaka to head the bank regulatory agency. It is not yet clear whether these monetary/political maneuvers signal an end to Japan’s decade-long failure to deal conclusively with its banking crisis and its ever-larger fiscal deficits. It is, however, clear that the economic pain of actually coming to grips with Japan’s mammoth bad loan problem will be severe, and the investment implications of an inevitable day of reckoning will be large.
Kuroto does not currently hold any Japanese equities. We have, however, sharply increased our Yen put position to hedge our indirect exposure to the potential impact of a rapid decline in the value of the Japanese Yen. In notional terms, our Yen puts now represent a multiple of the fund’s total capital and, we believe that the fund is well positioned for the possibility of an aggressive reflationary policy by the Bank of Japan.
Far more important is the possibility that in the wake of the severe suffering a real banking shake-out would cause in Japan, specifically the closure of many zombie companies, Japanese business culture may be forced to undergo a watershed change. The crisis in the late 1990’s in Korea had a transformative effect on the performance of many companies there. Standard and Poors’s has just published a report which highlights the beneficial effects of Korea’s experience on local bank managements and emphasizes that “Japan’s banks will never recover their health unless they undergo a drastic improvement in corporate governance similar to that imposed on South Korean financial institutions.” (Financial Times 10/16/02)
“In Korea, following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, corporate governance at the banks has undergone substantial improvement,”…an increase in foreign ownership, improved board structures and recognition that management and shareholders should be held accountable for their actions. (S&P Report)
Kuroto has been a major beneficiary of the Korean managerial refocus on profitability which grew out of the 1997-98 crisis. It is not an exaggeration to state that much of Kuroto’s outperformance in recent years has been a function of our investment decision to own Korean as opposed to Japanese stocks. We remain hopeful that at some point, now maybe sooner, Japan might offer us an incredible opportunity to buy outstanding, highly profitable businesses at fire sale prices, just as Korea did post-crisis. That said, it remains to be seen whether structural reform in Japan will achieve the pace and success seen in Korea.
Seoul Calling
Kuroto’s lack of Japanese investments, despite a serious effort to find them, is largely a function of the unconvincing profit motivation demonstrated by the managements of listed Japanese companies. As we often remind investors, “Japan is the country where the local cigarette monopoly earns only two percent on shareholders’ equity.”
Japanese disregard for profitability contrasts with our experience in Korea, where recent profit reports of the select companies that Kuroto owns continue to surprise to the upside. Though Koreans once embraced the Japanese business model, several years ago our research identified a few companies in the Hermit Kingdom where meaningful managerial change was producing solid financial progress.
But, real North Asian managerial reform is not manifested solely in profit margins; it is also visible in the way that managements choose to communicate with minority shareholders. So we are greatly encouraged that, during the recent quarter, Kuroto participated in initial conference calls with several of our Seoul-based companies with the expressed purpose of discussing recent corporate cashflow allocation decisions. While widespread in the Western world, this new development in Korea speaks volumes about these companies’ newfound interest in communicating with their shareholders. We view this as a small, but very positive, “straw in the wind.”
Sincerely,
Sean Fieler
William W. Strong









