Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q1 2006 Letter
Dear Partners and Friends,
Hay Fever Season Markets
It is hay fever season in New York and when we sneeze, Asian capital markets always seem to catch a very bad cold. For the third spring in a row, Asian stocks have dropped sharply and our fund has followed suit. In the previous two years, we took advantage of the seasonal decline and enthusiastically added to our long positions. This year, however, we’ve added to our cash position and assumed a more defensive posture.
Throughout this spring, our value based methodology led us to take profits in some of our long-held core positions (Indian positions in particular). These sales, when combined with a few additional sales attributable to fundamental business-specific problems, as well as the decline in price of our remaining equities, have reduced Kuroto’s net invested position to the lowest it has been in half a decade.
While Kuroto isn't in the business of making economic forecasts, we do try to envisage future financial environments that differ from the current one. We can, for instance, imagine a world that is not awash with liquidity, with an interest rate level and term structure that reflects "tightness." Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, we are also finding it quite easy to fathom the onset of a recession that would blight the world’s major economies.
In such an environment(s), what do we want to own? Our answer, which may surprise, is not “US dollar T-bills.” Should a hostile financial scenario come to pass, we are circumspect about a "flight" to what was heretofore considered "quality." It is our contention that the US dollar and the economy which is defined by the massive export thereof, is not where we want to take refuge. Though we acknowledge there is a substantial short-term trading risk to our strategy, we maintain that excellent, stable, modestly valued businesses in countries with fundamentally undervalued currencies are preferable to the usual financial bomb shelter.
With our stocks and currencies having declined much more than home grown assets during the current hay fever season, there is, as of yet, scant evidence that our preference for superior Asian assets is working well as a ‘safe haven.’ Kuroto is, however, nothing if not patient and persistent.
Indian Banks
The Indian banking sector is often thought of as being divided into two categories, public and private, but in reality it is divided into at least three categories: the public sector banks, which were nationalized in 1969; the old private sector banks, which escaped nationalization in 1969; and the new private sector banks, which were chartered together in 1994. There are significant legal and cultural differences among these three kinds of banks, differences which merit further explanation and have meaningful implications for the future performance of each category of bank.
New Private Sector
Old Private Sector
Public Sector
History
Founded in 1994
Not nationalized in 1969
Nationalized in 1969
Ownership
Govt. owns 0%
Govt. owns 0%
Govt. owns >50%
Raising capital
No restrictions
No restrictions
Extremely difficult
Management
Western-quality managers who receive market-based and incentivized compensation. Managers are appointed by the board of directors based on merit and can remain in the job so long as they perform well.
Quality of management varies widely. Compensation is often considerably lower than at new private sector banks thus making it difficult to attract top managers. Managers are appointed by the board of directors based on merit and can remain in the job so long as they perform well.
Quality of management varies widely. Compensation is not competitive. Managers are appointed by the government based on political considerations, and are rarely allowed to stay more than three years. Even very good managers cannot stay over the long-term.
Unions
None
Individual unions for each bank
Single national union for all public sector banks
Hire/fire and incentivize employees
No restrictions
Many restrictions, though there are some loopholes
Many restrictions; no loopholes
Valuations
Not Cheap
Cheap
Very Cheap
As the above table indicates, large distinctions can easily be drawn between new private sector banks and public sector banks. New private sector banks, which are largely free from the socialist legacy that burdens both old private sector and public sector banks, tend to be efficient and well run, with a young and incentivized workforce. Public sector banks, on the other hand, which are often saddled with politically connected managements and bloated workforces, tend to be quite inefficient. Given their structural advantages, the new private sector banks will likely continue to take market share from their conservative and less able public-sector brethren for many years to come.
Unfortunately, the structural advantage possessed by the new private banks has not been lost on the stock market. It is not uncommon for new private sector banks to quote at four to five times the valuations of the public banks, on both an earnings and a book-value basis. With the new private banks trading at such rich valuations and the public sector banks legally constrained from improving their businesses or recruiting better management, we’ve focused much of our research on the often overlooked third category of Indian bank: old private sector banks.
Old private sector banks are those banks that existed during the period of nationalization, 1969-1991, but were never nationalized. Often regional in focus, and generally smaller in market capitalization, the old private sector banks are quite distinct from both public sector banks as well as new private sector banks. Though they possess many of the freedoms of the new private sector banks, they nonetheless retain some of the disadvantages of the public banks. These limitations at the old private sector banks are not legal limitations, as is often the case at the public sector banks, but they are rather cultural limitations, stemming from the history of this group of banks. Accordingly, creative management at an old private sector bank can circumvent these cultural limitations and change their institutions for the better. We’ve identified one or two superior managements in charge of old private sector banks that are taking steps to create a properly incentivized workforce and a healthy credit culture. Old private sector banks with strong regional franchises and enterprising managements potentially offer the best of both worlds: new private sector quality at public sector valuations.
Sincerely,
Sean Fieler
William W. Strong









