Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q2 2001 Letter
Dear Partners and Friends,
Performance
Kuroto’s performance over the proceeding twelve-month bear market is almost forty-five percentage points superior to the returns of comparable benchmark indices. It is important that our partners understand that these results are largely a function of our stock buying prowess—not our short selling. Though we have shorts and they have been nicely profitable, it is the business success of the shares we own and their increase in valuation that have provided most of our relative out-performance.
Due mostly to the appreciation of our Korean positions and our divestiture from one fully valued company in Japan, during the second quarter our Korean exposure rose while our Japanese exposure fell to virtually zero. Our one-sided country weighting in North Asia is consistent with our view of the similarly lop-sided attractiveness of the businesses we have found in Korea when compared with those we have studied in Japan.
Why Korea Now?
Why own Korean companies in these trying times for that country’s economy? It is a question we ask ourselves every time we consider the serious economic problems this country faces. For example, the financial press has consistently and rightly pointed out the precarious position of Korea’s banks, the postponement of further meaningful market reform, and the inadequacy of Korea’s corporate governance.
What you will not read in the financial press, or almost anywhere else for that matter, is that the Korean equity market is among the least expensive and least efficient in the world—a fact that makes this country extremely fertile ground for stock pickers like ourselves. In many instances, the price of Korean stocks more than discounts every possible disaster, save a resumption of the Korean War.
We do not expect the Korean equity market to forever remain valued as it is today. One reason to expect a change is the influence rapidly growing domestic pension funds will have on this country’s capital markets. Their expansion will largely come from a government mandated increase in pension fund contributions, from the current level of only three percent of individual income.
We have chosen to highlight the prospective effect of this government’s action, despite our detailed knowledge of the long Asian history of failed governmental interference in domestic stock markets. From Japan to Taiwan to Hong Kong, governments have not been averse to enacting what are often referred to as stock market “stabilization” measures. These measures tend to be of questionable value in the short-run and of absolutely no value in the long-run, but this time could be different. The government in question has retained outside professional investors to manage a portion of these pension monies, a decision which we believe dramatically increases the probability that these monies will be invested in a rational manner.
More importantly, due to historically high Korean interest rates, only three to four percent of local pension assets are currently invested in equities. With Korean rates now in the mid-single digits, and Korean stocks, such as our companies, sporting earnings yields up to fifty percent, we think that the pension equity allocation could rise materially.
Finally, what type of equities might these institutions want to own? Pensions should seek long duration investments to offset their long duration liabilities—in contrast to the short term “lottery tickets,” favored by Korean retail investors today. Stable, growing, well managed companies, such as the ones Kuroto owns seem a good fit with the growing investment needs of the Korean pension investors. The effect of Korea’s growing pension wealth on Kuroto’s returns could be very salutary almost regardless of the outcome of Korea’s economic travails.
Sincerely,
Sean Fieler
William W. Strong
Gifford Combs









