Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q1 2007 Letter
Dear Partners and Friends,
Ever Larger Hedge Funds
In light of the unhealthy levels of optimism pervading financial markets globally and the growing scarcity of undervalued securities in Asia, we have been reducing Kuroto Fund’s net exposure. Scaling back while so many other hedge funds are ramping up has not been easy. That said, we are confident that our competitors’ rapid expansion is not a result of their greater capacity to uncover superior investment ideas, but rather, is a calculated response to our industry’s fee structure. Ironically, in their haste to maximize the value of their own businesses, hedge fund managers are accepting more money than they can run responsibly and, consequently, are impairing their ability to generate superior returns, the very thing that justifies the high fees that make their businesses so valuable in the first place.
Superior Financial Franchises
With the benefit of hindsight, we’re developing a growing appreciation for a select few American monoline finance companies, companies that for decades were simply better run than their peers, companies that innovated when others didn’t, with innovations that made sense, adding value to both the lender and borrower. Think of MBNA and Golden West. These companies introduced thoughtful wrinkles to proven financial products and built organizations with the culture and competence to exploit the market niches they’d created.
It is worth noting, that despite their many years of consistently superior performance, both firms sold out recently, Golden West to Wachovia and MBNA to Bank of America. These decisions to sell beg the question, “Why now?” The answer, we believe, is straight forward. The long-term growth prospects of these two businesses are no longer what they once were. Herb Sandler, Golden West’s co-chair, made exactly this point when asked why he and his wife were selling the company they’d spent the preceding forty-three years building:
“Our great strength is our focus and our discipline. We operate in a very narrow niche, and we do it extraordinarily well. But the negative is that we are, in fact, a monoline company. We are a one product company, and you can just go so far as a one product company. We probably have X years ahead of us of continued growth, but at some point, whether it is 200 billion or 250 billion, at some point….” (Herb Sandler, May 8th, 2006)
Today, in America, most financial products are pretty near that “some point” to which Herb was referring. The consumer is clearly overlevered, and debt instruments have already been sliced and diced to the limits of credulity. Where the financially innovative products of yesteryear made sense, affinity cards and option arms were logical, transparent extensions of existing products that if responsibly structured were good for both the borrower and the lender. The latest financial innovations make decidedly less sense. Take credit default swaps for example, a recent innovation which is rapidly replacing the physical market for corporate bonds. In exchange for what are seen to be their principal benefits, namely leverage and liquidity, credit default swaps bring reduced pricing transparency, increased legal complexity, added counterparty risk and, most importantly, the lack of a track record during periods of financial distress. In short, we’re deeply skeptical that the aforementioned tradeoffs embodied in credit default swaps will be viewed positively when the financial history of the current period is recorded.
The investment idea we’ve taken from studying Golden West and MBNA is not simply to avoid Wachovia, Bank of America and the credit default swap market. Instead, we’ve elected to invest in a handful of overseas companies that remind us of MBNA and Golden West twenty years ago. We own a housing finance company in Asia, which bears a close resemblance to Golden West in the 1980s. Management of this Asian company has built an impressive track record, not by betting correctly on interest rates, but by flat out executing better than their competitors. By maintaining near-zero credit losses since its inception, this company has compounded shareholders’ equity at more than 20% per annum over that same period – a truly exceptional feat. Importantly, we own the aforementioned company in an environment where the loan to value ratios remain prudent, mortgage debt to GDP is low and financial engineering is still in its nascent stages.
Elsewhere in Asia we own a consumer finance company that, like MBNA in the 1980s, is developing and marketing unsecured credit products in a thoughtful and innovative way. This company is aggressively moving into a mispriced segment of the consumer credit market, and its management brings a credit expertise and business acumen which is notably absent in its competitors. Consequently, we expect this company to become the dominant franchise in this market and enjoy years of a virtuous cycle in which consumers lever up responsibly.
Personnel Changes
Over the past twelve months, we’ve had two employees leave and four join. We’d like to first thank our departing employees and wish them all the best in their new endeavors. In March, Imaan Kabir left us to take a well deserved break before entering NYU’s Stern Business School this fall. And, in May, Yui Tsao resigned to pursue other opportunities in the money management industry. The recent additions to our team are Brian Tsai, Jenifer Sentiwany, Nancy Glazer and Marco LoCascio. Brian, our new COO, has been overseeing our ongoing series of organizational and administrative improvements. He is joined by, Jenifer and Nancy who are picking up where Imaan left off. And last, but not least, in July, Marco LoCascio, this past year’s summer intern and recent Amherst College graduate, will be joining our research team.
Equinox Illiquid Update
Equinox Illiquid, L.P. launched on January 1, 2007. For the five month period ending May 31st, the fund’s estimated performance is +12.0% net of all fees.
To date, we’ve allocated $24m USD among three separate sub-advisors: $10m USD to Brazil, $7m USD to South Korea and $7m USD to Global Mining. While it is taking us some time to get the capital to work, we are encouraged with the fund’s progress. As we are expecting to add an additional sub-advisor later this year, Equinox Illiquid will be open for both new and additional subscriptions on July 1, 2007.
Sincerely,
Sean Fieler
William W. Strong









