Mine Visit Note: Perseus

EQUINOX PARTNERS - Precious Metals Miners
Site visit—Perseus Mining 
February 2020 

Dates February 6-11, 2020

Mines Visited Yaoure, Sissingue, and Edikan

Countries Visited Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana

Analyst Coille Van Alphen


OVERVIEW

Perseus (PRU Australia) is a gold miner with two operating mines and one mine in development in West Africa. The company is well capitalized and has top tier management, good governance and can execute in a tough jurisdiction. PRU is a 2% position in the SMAs.

 

metrics

Market Cap $900m USD
Enterprise Value $907m USD
EV/CF 5.1x 2020 estimate cash flow
P/NAV (5% discounts) 0.6x
Resources 6.5m ounces of gold
EV/Resource
$141 per ounce of gold
Reserves
2.9m ounces of gold
EV/Reserves $309 per ounce of gold
All-in-sustaining cost
$888 per ounce of gold 

Thesis

Perseus Mining has two producing assets and is in the middle of constructing its third asset, Yaoure, in Cote d’Ivoire. Once Yaoure is commissioned, the company should produce ~500,000 oz. by 2021 and generate substantial FCF (~USD$125m per year at $1700 gold). Yaoure has the potential to provide PRU with a “cornerstone asset” from which they can start to upgrade the portfolio metrics. The company trades at 0.6x P/NAV and is not covered by any sell side analysts because of its 2014 operational failure at Edikan. Management replaced several key people in 2014, and the company has clearly demonstrated operational stability at Edikan. Generating FCF from low grade material in Ghana is challenging at the best of times, but PRU has achieved plant and mine stability over the last 12 months and I am optimistic they have finally found the right balance.


Trip summary

Overall, the trip was well run, informative, and I left having a better understanding of their operational strengths which weren’t evident prior to seeing the assets. The one thing that particularly stood out from the tour is the very conservative nature of the company: from security protocols to resource modeling, the company doesn’t want to lose the market credibility they have built up over the last 18 months which is stemming from more consistent operations. The company has learned a lot from building Sissingue, a small mine footprint, which they are applying to Yaoure and should enable them to meet capex and construction timelines of Q1 2021.


By the end of this quarter (Q1 2020) they will have paid back their initial capex of $106M at Sissingue, and they are trying their best to extend the mine life to generate as much FCF as possible. Edikan was working much better than it looks on paper, and I have more confidence in their current LOM plan, and am keen to see what the new exploration targets generate. Processing ~1 gpt rock in Ghana is marginal, but they seem to have reached an inflection point where they can consistently generate FCF. They have not historically had a lot of additional FCF to spend on exploration at any of the assets due to patchy operational success, but they are starting to spend money on this area now due to a growing cash balance. Their exploration approach seems quite sensible, and they are willing to allocate more capital based on results.


Management and governance


Jeff Quartermaine, CFO of PRU during all of Edikan’s previous woes and Managing Director (CEO) since 2014, personifies the company’s conservative culture. Andrew Grove has recently been brought on in an IR/Corp development role and does a good job of providing a more enthusiastic face to the market, while also being very qualified for corporate development given his time at Macquarie. In terms of compensation, it should be noted that their compensation packages are very modest when compared to their North American peers. 

JURISDICTIONO

Cote d’Ivoire is a high-risk country: the upcoming election outcome is very uncertain, but with President Ouattara and Gbabgo both out of the race, the election outcome should not spark civil disorder. Ghana is a medium risk country: there is also a presidential election in 2020 and growing frustration with mining taxes not reaching the local communities. Within the Cote d’Ivoire, a 0.5% royalty goes to the community in the form of a fund called the CDLM. The fund is composed of two individuals from each impacted community, along with one person from PRU. At the moment, most of the money is going towards infrastructure, but as they get further up the development curve they would like it to transition to education.

 

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

In Ghana, because the royalty that is supposed to be paid to the community is not reaching the community, PRU decided to allocate USD$300,000 per year towards a fund in order to win the trust of the community. From the surface, it doesn’t appear they are doing anything beyond basic infrastructure, basic health, and basic education. I would

like to see the CSR projects more advanced at Yaoure, given the community started with a higher level of development versus the other mine sites. This being said, the communities were all welcoming and happy to have us walk around and see the various infrastructure initiatives.

 

Security

The Security costs in Cote d’Ivoire have picked up. The company is monitoring the election in December because they worry that if Ouattara (the current president) doesn’t step down and give it to the second in line, then another civil war could break out. Flights started once per week in January 2020 from Sissingue in order to limit the use of roads. In Abidjan, we stayed in a hotel that had the most stringent bomb checking measures I have ever been through. While we were allowed to go out for one meal, the rest of the time we were not allowed to the leave the hotel ground. 

In Ghana, the security tone was much more muted: they drove us 8 hours to the airport without a security convoy. The roads in Ghana were far worse than I remembered, and I could see why there is growing frustration with the level of infrastructure in the country.


Catalysts

Perseus will publish a new life-of-mine plan (LOM) shortly. It will use $1300 versus the current $1250/oz., which should have a positive impact by bringing in additional ounces (particularly Edikan). Because PRU’s LOMs are quite short, this should be meaningful to the valuation. Overall, I will add ~1 year of production at Sissingue and ~3 years at Edikan. Bringing in Yaoure on time and on budget will also help, but I think exploration success at the asset will be more meaningful to cement it as their cornerstone asset.


MINES

Edikan (90% interest)

Their COO has had a very large impact on the organization. Chris came from Barrick/Goldcorp, and is energized about turning around operations. I attribute his arrival to Edikan’s recent consistency. His impact at Edikan is obvious, as they have really started to make sustainable progress keeping the mill recoveries stable.


LOM gold production is currently expected to be 1.08 million ounces over the remaining 6 year mine life; however, there is potential to extend the current mine life through exploration and inclusion of the Esuajah South and the AG pit optimization into the LOM.


Esuajah South: the potential material could be removed by open pit and or underground mining at Esuajah South (ESS) but part of the reason they prefer the underground option is because it reduces the number of people impacted (and therefore relocated). The open pit option would require relocating essentially half the town, which would be a very significant cost. They had to relocate 200 homes, along with a church, police station etc. The topography was a little more difficult (on top of a hill) which increased the cost. The cost was $25 million. This relocation gives them plenty of flexibility though to expand the relocation area with more houses if necessary.


The nameplate capacity of the mill is 5.5Mtpa but they are currently doing 7.5Mtpa. The addition of the Mill Slicer (an initiative put in place by Chris) has been an upgrade that has also led to several additional improvements in the mill. They usually use grid power, but the transmission of grid power isn’t consistent so they have added generator sets. They are now working with GenSer who is providing another source of stable power and will lower their power costs. Keeping the mill going is particularly important there given the grade—every hour the mill is down costs them ~$500 oz.


Continuous improvement has been started and they are identifying 2nd order projects to work on. They believe they have executed on the obvious first pass projects. They added a carbon column to reprocess the tailings water which is now adding 500 oz per month. The cost of carbon column was paid back in three weeks.

 

Exploration at Edikan: The company has recently changed out its exploration team because they needed “new blood”. Targets that had been previously identified as unlikely are now proving to be much more interesting. They have also identified some new areas (don’t have the ground yet) that have many artisanal miners working on it. They are going to be spending ~$6.5 million in 2020. While it is difficult to quantify how many more ounces are there, I was the most optimistic about the mine’s upside vs. the rest of the portfolio. The Anikokoso prospect and the Agyakusu prospects are the targets we should be monitoring for progress.


Yaoure (90% interest)

The main takeaway is that the project is roughly on schedule and running slightly below budget. At the moment they are forecasting it to cost $258m vs. the $265m in the feasibility study; however, they are only 35% through construction. They are still targeting initial production for December 2020, but that is a stretch goal. At the moment, the FS outlines Yaouré’s life of mine gold production to be 1.4Moz at an AISC of USD$759/oz over 8.5 year. This study doesn’t include the initial underground inferred resource of 595 koz grading 6.2 g/t gold. I would expect ~50% of those ounces to con  vert to reserves and make it into a mine plan which would further extend mine LOM by ~1.5 years. Currently within the Cote d’Ivoire there isn’t an underground mining convention, so they need to work through this before they can upgrade to a reserve and provide economics around those ounces.

All major contracts have been awarded, and so far EPC work is on schedule and there have been no major scope changes. They are clearly having some issues getting items released at the port, which is impacting various things but nothing on the critical path at the moment.


The project is much closer to infrastructure and people than Sissingue is, which will have positive and negative impacts on the project. The communities have much higher expectations. They have 5 impacted communities, along with a 6th that they include despite it technically not being in the catchment area. They include it because they feel it is close enough to be included and want to keep the expectations the same for all communities nearby. At the moment, they are employing 56% of the workforce from the local communities, and they would like to increase this figure to 60% once production starts. In addition to employing locals the government mandates that 0.5% of revenue must go back to communities and the communities decide how to allocate that money.


Exploration at Yaoure: They have some additional targets; Sayiko is the next key target. They need to remove the artisanal workers before they are able to mobilize a rig to test it, despite it being on their mining lease. They continue to believe it’s a large system, but so far they haven’t found anything meaningful. They have had a few “technical successes” but haven’t vectored in on the next CMA pit. It should be noted though that they haven’t spent a lot of money on exploration, so they are in the very early stages of exploration on the rest of the ground.


Sissingue (86% interest)

The mine started in 2018, exiting construction ahead of time and on budget. Currently the mine is producing 80,000 oz. per year from 3 pits. The flowsheet and mill are basic, but it has been running closer to 1.4 Mtpa due to blending (nameplate capacity of the mill is 1Mtpa). The recoveries have also been slightly better at ~94% vs. the 90% outlined in the FS. They believe, based on what they have milled so far, that as they transition to 100% fresh rock the recoveries should not drop to 86% as outlined in the FS. They think they can keep them around 90-94%, which would be an incremental positive. Maintenance (and therefore productivity) has been an issue, but the contractor has compensated for this by having extra equipment around.


Exploration at Sissingue: Zanikan is the most tangible exploration target that they have. They think it could at ~9 months of production. Sissingue doesn’t look like it has a lot of additional upside, so the likely outcome is that the mill is packed up and moved to a new deposit in country. Lykopodium has told them that relocating the mill would save them ~$30- $40m in capex.

 

*** END ***


*Figures and statements as of February visit. This is an internal research note written by an analyst employed by Mason Hill Advisors, LLC. It is not intended for distribution. This information was intended exclusively for the person to whom it was delivered and ought not to be distributed further. Opinions are expressed throughout this note as of the date of the note. Opinions can be wrong or can prove to be right. Investment decisions are made in part as a result of mine visits and company discussions, but not exclusively so.


Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Any investment in a fund or managed account entails a risk of loss, including the entire amount invested. Performance is shown net of management fees, performance fee, and expenses, for each series in the consolidated managed account unless otherwise indicated. Account values are presented gross. Index returns adjusted for inception date of accounts. All performance is unaudited and based on valuations prepared by the adviser and is subject to revision. Net exposure includes short position exposure. See the End Notes on the following page for more important information regarding the performance information shown. 


End Notes


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By Kieran Brennan • November 3, 2026
Sean Fieler and Equinox Partners Profiled in OWL October 2026 Edition
By Kieran Brennan • November 3, 2026
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE The Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund rose +19.6% in the third quarter and is up +21.1% for the year to date. By comparison, in the third quarter, the price of gold ticked up +2.8% and the MVIS Junior Gold Mining Index rallied +16.8%, finishing the year to date through Q3 down -3.8% and up 0.3% respectively. Performance for the quarter was driven by our producing miner portfolio, and most notably our largest holding, Solidcore Resources, which rose +60%. In September, Solidcore announced a tender offer to buy back over 23% of its shares outstanding, and in early October the company confirmed the entire offer had been tendered. Other notable sources of outperformance in the quarter were our investments in producers such as B2Gold, DPM Metals, and Discovery Mining. The exploration-stage segment of the portfolio rallied +10%, lagging the move in the MVIS Junior Gold Mining Index. Portfolio Activity In the third quarter, we initiated three new pre-production positions and added to five of our existing portfolio companies. We fully exited two portfolio companies, including Omai Gold Mines, at a substantial profit. We also continued to trim two of our West African producing gold miners. In mid-2024, our Africa exposure was over 40% portfolio weight. Today our exposure to Africa is less than 15%. This reduction has been offset by our increasing exposure to companies in Kazakhstan and Canada. Site Visits The mining research team has been traveling extensively in recent months. We have conducted mine site visits to portfolio company projects in Papua New Guinea (K92 & New Pacific), Kazakhstan (Solidcore, Arres & Pallas), Northern Territories of Canada (B2Gold). We also attended a series of mining conferences in Colorado where we spent time with the management teams and directors of several of our investments. We remain high-conviction gold mining investors given our federal government's failure to control spending. In the letter that follows, we will discuss the politics of America's ballooning debt. The Changing Politics of America's Government Debt “How did you go bankrupt?” “Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.” Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises America’s federal government is in the gradual phase of bankruptcy. Our fiscal path is unsustainable, but it remains unclear when we will be forced to change. The Japanese ran their government debt-to-GDP ratio over 200% without a crisis. So, with America’s federal debt-to-GDP at a mere 123%, our politicians continue to spend as if deficits don't matter. Conventional wisdom on Wall Street holds that the Treasury market will dictate the timing of the ultimate solution. When the federal government can't roll over its debt on acceptable terms, politicians will act. But, even when that moment arrives, the crisis will be manageable. The Treasury and Federal Reserve will both buy Treasury bonds to maintain order in capital markets while politicians work out a solution. We are less sanguine about the contours of America’s debt endgame. The current turmoil in France is a reminder of just how toxic the combination of over-indebtedness, social unrest and a presidential election cycle can be. There are an uncomfortable number of similarities between the current situation in France and America. Like France, America is socially and politically divided. Like France, cost-of-living increases are the top political issue in the U.S. And, like France, America has an upcoming presidential election which could usher in meaningful policy change. In France, the twilight of Macron’s 10-year presidency prompted serious political proposals. Marine Le Pen, currently leading the polls with 35% of first-round votes, has proposed reducing government spending by €140 billion cumulatively over the next six years. And, her most plausible challenger, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has proposed simply writing off the French debt held by the French Central Bank. America’s presidential election cycle begins next Wednesday, promptly after the November midterms. We expect Americans aspiring to the presidency will also float a variety of serious fiscal proposals. The ideas will likely include everything from a wealth tax to means-testing Social Security. At this moment, it’s not the specifics of the proposals that matter as no one credible is likely to propose radical spending cuts. Rather, it is the political appetite to do something, a calculation that stands in stark contrast to the political wisdom in America’s last three presidential election cycles. In 2016, with America’s national debt-to-GDP at just 105% ($20 trillion at the time), our debt crisis didn’t yet appear politically ripe for solving. In 2020, the COVID crisis and related emergency spending drowned out any discussion about America's unsustainable fiscal path. And, most recently, in the 2024 election, Trump was able to dismiss out of hand questions about the fiscal deficit, while Joe Biden and Kamala Harris were forced to focus on their competence to serve as president. As such, America has gone through ten long years without serious discussion about our fiscal situation. America's 2028 political cycle will likely prove a turning point in this regard, just as the 2027 election is proving to be a turning point for France. As our 2028 cycle heats up, markets will likely conclude that something is going to happen and will begin to discount the looming policy shock. It is also likely, in our opinion, that a Democratic-controlled Congress, in cooperation with a lame-duck President Trump, will take a stab at America’s fiscal problem preemptively. Trump is not one to punt on hard decisions, and his Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is on the record stating that he took the job because he wants to participate in a global economic reordering. He may soon get the chance. Organizational Update In September, we added Will Robinson to our investment team. He joins us from Sixth Street Partners, where he was an associate on their Infrastructure investment team. Will originally hails from Texas, outside of Dallas, and received a B.B.A. in Finance from The University of Texas at Austin. We are excited for him to bolster the analytical horsepower of our mining research.
By Kieran Brennan • November 2, 2026
Sean Fieler Interviews Judy Shelton at Monetary Forum in D.c. 2026 "A Conversation on Monetary Governance and Federal Reserve Oversight"
By Kieran Brennan • October 30, 2026
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund, L.P. was up +8.6%, net of all fees, in the third quarter of 2026, and is up +43.4% for the year-to-date. By comparison, the MSCI Emerging Markets Index declined -0.4% in the quarter and is now up +23.4% for the year-to-date. The MSCI Frontier Markets Index declined -0.3% in the third quarter and is up +9.8% year-to-date. Performance in the third quarter was led by an exceptionally strong quarter for shares in our Kazakh gold miner, Solidcore Resources, followed by over +20% moves in both our energy equities and our financials holdings in Georgia and Kazakhstan. In the letter to follow, we provide an update on Kuroto’s energy portfolio in light of the strong year-to-date returns and discuss our decisions to sell energy investments Gran Tierra Energy and Seplat Energy. Lastly, we share our updated outlook for Brazil post-election. Oil Portfolio Update Coming into 2026, the oil and gas equities in Kuroto had a 22% aggregate portfolio weighting. Collectively, that portfolio has appreciated +89%, contributing over one-third of the fund’s gross performance for the year. Since then, we have reduced our exposure to the sector, with oil and gas equities now making up 15% of the fund. We exited our investment in Seplat Energy and have nearly completed the exit of our holding in Gran Tierra Energy. These oil and gas equities appreciated in part because of the oil price spike induced by the Iran conflict, as well as for idiosyncratic, company-specific reasons. As we analyze our three remaining oil and gas positions, we believe they are attractively valued and should also provide the portfolio with a partial hedge should oil prices rise further due to the deterioration of the conflict in the Middle East. With the capital raised via sales of energy equities, we reallocated into attractively priced investments in Brazil, such as Grupo GPS, as well as into new positions in countries that have been negatively affected by the high oil prices from the Iran conflict, namely Bangladesh and Egypt. Gran Tierra Energy Sale We initiated our holding in Gran Tierra Energy in Kuroto in July 2025. The company had traded off significantly when it followed up its 2024 exploration success in Ecuador with the ill-advised acquisition of i3 Energy in Canada. The transaction, which didn’t make financial or strategic sense, caused Gran Tierra’s stock to decline by over 40%. At the discounted share price, we decided to build our position and influence over the company. We ultimately bought 18% of the company and decided to join the board with the intention of improving Gran Tierra’s capital allocation decisions. Sensing the likely result of our decision, Gran Tierra’s board preemptively undertook a strategic review of its portfolio. That review resulted in a decision to sell the company’s Latin American business to surface value. That transaction, announced in early August of this year, enabled us to begin selling our position at attractive prices. Decision to Exit Seplat Energy We first started purchasing shares of Seplat in Kuroto in December 2021. When the company bought Exxon out of Nigeria, we substantially increased our position. We always viewed Seplat as the best run Nigerian oil company. The company’s breakeven production costs were so low that Seplat was able to keep paying its dividend throughout 2020 when the Brent Crude oil price averaged $43 per barrel, including through the depths of the COVID-induced oil crash. And because of the Exxon deal, Seplat was able to more than double the business without raising equity. Despite these attractive attributes, Seplat traded at a substantial discount to international peers due to the poor reputation of its home country. Prior to 2026, the stock traded at a 20-30% free cash flow (FCF) yield and paid a high single-digit dividend yield, while also investing to grow production. We particularly liked Seplat’s shareholding structure. At the time of our investment, the company had a variety of unaffiliated shareholders, each with their own board representation. The French oil company Maurel et Prom owned 20% of Seplat; the two co-founders each owned stakes ranging from 6% to 12%; another 15% was owned by the South African asset managers Allan Gray and Sustainable Capital; and 14% of the company was owned by Monaco-based investor Samuel Dossou. In short, there was no single owner powerful enough to take advantage of minority investors and impair our investment. Early this year, the distributed ownership structure of Seplat ended abruptly. Tony Elumelu, a Nigerian billionaire, acquired Maurel et Prom’s 20% stake and was appointed to Seplat’s board. Shortly thereafter, the two South African asset managers sold their shares as well. Tony was the rumored buyer of their shares. While it was impossible for us to verify these rumors, it became clear to us that Tony had complete control over the company. We viewed Tony’s control with skepticism, but his purchase was viewed very favorably by local Nigerian investors. The local view was that finally Seplat has a ‘Big Man’ in charge who has the ear of the ‘Big Men’ in Abuja and can get things done. While there is probably truth to this, Tony’s corporate governance track record made us uncomfortable with his level of control. Once in control, Tony removed Roger Brown, Seplat’s foreign CEO whom we greatly respected, and installed a local Nigerian in his place. Tony also made himself the Chairman of Seplat’s board. Again, to our surprise, the market applauded these moves and the stock rallied further. We sold half our position on the day of the CEO change announcement and then met with both the new CEO and Tony himself to dig deeper into the new governance structure. After both meetings, and a subsequent further increase in the share price, we exited the position completely. We sold the last of our shares at a 10% FCF yield on our forward-year forecast, or a mid-teens FCF yield 3-5 years out. After we sold, the stock rallied another 15% and now trades at an estimated 8% FCF yield on forward estimates, and a low-teens FCF yield 3-5 years out. Seplat was a very successful investment for us. From when we purchased it to today, annual production and cash flow have more than tripled. Our Seplat investment returned over 700% prior to Tony's involvement, and has nearly doubled again in the short time since he bought in. In total, our initial holding in Kuroto returned over 1,000% across our nearly five-year investment. Some of this was good stock picking, and some was luck. Brazil's Election Brazil’s election delivered a series of surprises: Flavio's first-round victory, Lula’s second-round victory, Justice Moraes' attempt to confiscate Flavio's passport, and Flavio's decision to relocate to the United States. With Lula still in power, we expect the Brazilian real will weaken as Lula forces policy rates lower without the necessary fiscal adjustment. This scenario will present a challenging macroeconomic backdrop for our companies but is not all bad news. In an environment of scarce capital, our well-capitalized portfolio companies will likely consolidate their sector leadership positions. Several of our Brazilian portfolio companies stand to benefit from softening competition from private equity. One of our investments that should benefit from an environment with a higher cost of capital in Brazil is Grupo GPS, the country's leading business services outsourcing company. A key part of the investment thesis is that GPS will continue to make high-return acquisitions, and a lower valuation environment should help. We recently profiled Grupo GPS as an example of our investment process. If you haven’t already, we encourage you to watch our case study webinar (access the replay via the following link: Grupo GPS Case Study - Oct 2026 - Video Replay ). Organizational Update In September, we added Will Robinson to our investment team. He joins us from Sixth Street Partners, where he was an associate on their Infrastructure investment team. Will originally hails from Texas, outside of Dallas, and received a B.B.A. in Finance from The University of Texas at Austin. We are excited for him to bolster the analytical horsepower of our mining research.
By Kieran Brennan • October 29, 2026
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. rose +21.2% net of fees in the third quarter and is up +40.3% year to date. By comparison, the S&P 500 index appreciated +2.3% in the quarter and is up +12.7% for the year to date. Equinox’s strong performance in the quarter was driven by the appreciation of our precious metal mining equities as well as our energy-related investments. Our top mining holding, Solidcore Resources, rallied over 60% in the quarter, contributing to the outperformance of our gold mining equities relative to the broader industry averages. It is notable that these gains in the mining equities occurred during a quarter in which the spot gold price only rose a modest +2.8%. In the energy portfolio, the spot WTI oil price rose nearly 29% from $70 to $90 per barrel, yet our oil and gas stocks rose just +17% as markets continue to see high oil prices as a temporary phenomenon. We remain high-conviction gold mining investors given our federal government's failure to control spending. In the letter that follows, we will discuss the politics of America's ballooning debt, review two recent exits from our energy sector investments, and provide a post-election update on Brazil. The Changing Politics of America's Government Debt “How did you go bankrupt?” “Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.” Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises America’s federal government is in the gradual phase of bankruptcy. Our fiscal path is unsustainable, but it remains unclear when we will be forced to change. The Japanese ran their government debt-to-GDP ratio over 200% without a crisis. So, with America’s federal debt-to-GDP at a mere 123%, our politicians continue to spend as if deficits don't matter. Conventional wisdom on Wall Street holds that the Treasury market will dictate the timing of the ultimate solution. When the federal government can't roll over its debt on acceptable terms, politicians will act. But, even when that moment arrives, the crisis will be manageable. The Treasury and Federal Reserve will both buy Treasury bonds to maintain order in capital markets while politicians work out a solution. We are less sanguine about the contours of America’s debt endgame. The current turmoil in France is a reminder of just how toxic the combination of over-indebtedness, social unrest and a presidential election cycle can be. There are an uncomfortable number of similarities between the current situation in France and America. Like France, America is socially and politically divided. Like France, cost-of-living increases are the top political issue in the U.S. And, like France, America has an upcoming presidential election which could usher in meaningful policy change. In France, the twilight of Macron’s 10-year presidency prompted serious political proposals. Marine Le Pen, currently leading the polls with 35% of first-round votes, has proposed reducing government spending by €140 billion cumulatively over the next six years. And, her most plausible challenger, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has proposed simply writing off the French debt held by the French Central Bank. America’s presidential election cycle begins next Wednesday, promptly after the November midterms. We expect Americans aspiring to the presidency will also float a variety of serious fiscal proposals. The ideas will likely include everything from a wealth tax to means-testing Social Security. At this moment, it’s not the specifics of the proposals that matter as no one credible is likely to propose radical spending cuts. Rather, it is the political appetite to do something, a calculation that stands in stark contrast to the political wisdom in America’s last three presidential election cycles. In 2016, with America’s national debt-to-GDP at just 105% ($20 trillion at the time), our debt crisis didn’t yet appear politically ripe for solving. In 2020, the COVID crisis and related emergency spending drowned out any discussion about America's unsustainable fiscal path. And, most recently, in the 2024 election, Trump was able to dismiss out of hand questions about the fiscal deficit, while Joe Biden and Kamala Harris were forced to focus on their competence to serve as president. As such, America has gone through ten long years without serious discussion about our fiscal situation. America's 2028 political cycle will likely prove a turning point in this regard, just as the 2027 election is proving to be a turning point for France. As our 2028 cycle heats up, markets will likely conclude that something is going to happen and will begin to discount the looming policy shock. It is also likely, in our opinion, that a Democratic-controlled Congress, in cooperation with a lame-duck President Trump, will take a stab at America’s fiscal problem preemptively. Trump is not one to punt on hard decisions, and his Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is on the record stating that he took the job because he wants to participate in a global economic reordering. He may soon get the chance. Gran Tierra Energy Sale We invested in Gran Tierra Energy in June 2024 following the company’s exploration success in Ecuador. Immediately following our investment, Gran Tierra acquired i3 Energy in Canada. The transaction, which didn’t make financial or strategic sense, caused Gran Tierra’s stock to decline by over 40%. At Gran Tierra’s newly discounted share price, we decided to increase our ownership of and influence over the company. We ultimately bought 18% of the company and decided to join the board with the intention of improving Gran Tierra’s capital allocation decisions. Sensing the likely result of our decision, Gran Tierra’s board preemptively undertook a strategic review of its portfolio. That review resulted in a decision to sell the company’s Latin American business to surface value. That transaction, announced in early August of this year, enabled us to sell our position at an attractive price. Decision to Exit Seplat Energy We first started purchasing shares of Seplat Energy in March 2022. When the company bought Exxon out of Nigeria, we substantially increased our position. We always viewed Seplat as the best run Nigerian oil company. The company’s breakeven production costs were so low that Seplat was able to keep paying its dividend throughout 2020 when the Brent Crude oil price averaged $43 per barrel, including through the depths of the COVID-induced oil crash. And because of the Exxon deal, Seplat was able to more than double the business without raising equity. Despite these attractive attributes, Seplat traded at a substantial discount to international peers due to the poor reputation of its home country. Prior to 2026, the stock traded at a 20-30% free cash flow (FCF) yield and paid a high single-digit dividend yield, while also investing to grow production. We particularly liked Seplat’s shareholding structure. At the time of our investment, the company had a variety of unaffiliated shareholders, each with their own board representation. The French oil company Maurel et Prom owned 20% of Seplat; the two co-founders each owned stakes ranging from 6% to 12%; another 15% was owned by the South African asset managers Allan Gray and Sustainable Capital; and 14% of the company was owned by Monaco-based investor Samuel Dossou. In short, there was no single owner powerful enough to take advantage of minority investors and impair our investment. Early this year, the distributed ownership structure of Seplat ended abruptly. Tony Elumelu, a Nigerian billionaire, acquired Maurel et Prom’s 20% stake and was appointed to Seplat’s board. Shortly thereafter, the two South African asset managers sold their shares as well. Tony was the rumored buyer of their shares. While it was impossible for us to verify these rumors, it became clear to us that Tony had complete control over the company. We viewed Tony’s control with skepticism, but his purchase was viewed very favorably by local Nigerian investors. The local view was that finally Seplat has a ‘Big Man’ in charge who has the ear of the ‘Big Men’ in Abuja and can get things done. While there is probably truth to this, Tony’s corporate governance track record made us uncomfortable with his level of control. Once in control, Tony removed Roger Brown, Seplat’s foreign CEO whom we greatly respected, and installed a local Nigerian in his place. Tony also made himself the Chairman of Seplat’s board. Again, to our surprise, the market applauded these moves and the stock rallied further. We sold half our position on the day of the CEO change announcement and then met with both the new CEO and Tony himself to dig deeper into the new governance structure. After both meetings, and a subsequent further increase in the share price, we exited the position completely. We sold the last of our shares at a 10% FCF yield on our forward-year forecast, or a mid-teens FCF yield 3-5 years out. After we sold, the stock rallied another 15% and now trades at an estimated 8% FCF yield on forward estimates, and a low-teens FCF yield 3-5 years out. Seplat was a very successful investment for us. From when we purchased it to today, annual production and cash flow have more than tripled. Our Seplat investment returned approximately 250% prior to Tony's involvement, and more than doubled again in the short time after he bought in. In total, the position returned over 700% across our four-and-a-half-year holding period. Some part of this was good stock picking, and some part was luck. Brazil's Election Brazil’s election delivered a series of surprises: Flavio's first-round victory, Lula’s second-round victory, Justice Moraes' attempt to confiscate Flavio's passport, and Flavio's decision to relocate to the United States. With Lula still in power, we expect the Brazilian real will weaken as Lula forces policy rates lower without the necessary fiscal adjustment. This scenario will present a challenging macroeconomic backdrop for our companies but is not all bad news. In an environment of scarce capital, our well-capitalized portfolio companies will likely consolidate their sector leadership positions. Several of our Brazilian portfolio companies stand to benefit from softening competition from private equity. In the post-election sell-off, we added to our Brazilian currency hedge and our position in Grupo GPS. Grupo GPS is the leading business services outsourcing company in Brazil, and we recently profiled this relatively new investment as a case study of our process. If you haven’t already, we encourage you to watch our case study webinar ( access the replay via the following link : Grupo GPS Case Study - Oct 2026 - Video Replay ). Organizational Update In September, we added Will Robinson to our investment team. He joins us from Sixth Street Partners, where he was an associate on their Infrastructure investment team. Will originally hails from Texas, outside of Dallas, and received a B.B.A. in Finance from The University of Texas at Austin. We are excited for him to bolster the analytical horsepower of our mining research.
By Kieran Brennan • October 21, 2026
Grupo GPS - Case Study (Oct 2026) - Presentation + Q&A Replay
By Kieran Brennan • July 20, 2026
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. declined -6.0% in the second quarter of 2026, finishing the first half of the year up +1.3%. By comparison, in the second quarter, the price of gold declined -16.% and the MVIS Junior Gold Mining Index sold off -16.9%, finishing the first half of 2026 down -7.2% and -14.1% respectively. Performance for the quarter was driven by our exploration stage portfolio which in aggregate declined -9.3% amidst the declining gold price backdrop. Our portfolio of producing stage companies held up much better, only selling off -6.5%. Our largest producer, Solidcore Resources, was actually up +6% in the quarter. The portfolio also benefited from slightly elevated levels of cash, averaging 6% weight, which we were able to deploy part of as shares of our preferred companies returned back to our target IRR levels. Corporate Governance Corporate governance analysis is central to our research process. We view our long-term investments in publicly traded companies as partnerships with a company’s board of directors. Accordingly, we don't just want to know what decisions a board is making; we know why a board is making decisions. In our opinion, understanding a board’s motivation is the best way to gain durable insight into their corporate strategy and capital allocation policy. Our emphasis on corporate governance has helped us avoid value traps and understand our portfolio companies better. Active engagement is more than informed proxy voting. Active engagement entails a sincere dialogue with directors. While the relationships required for an honest back and forth are not easy to achieve, conversations with directors have become a real differentiator for our research process. Our corporate governance successes have added meaningful value, and our corporate governance failures have taught us important lessons. While each governance situation is unique, we face several recurring problems of note: Non-aligned directors: A surprising number of public company directors own little to no stock. These non-aligned directors fall into two categories: directors who lack sufficient wealth to own a meaningful amount of stock, and wealthy directors who choose not to own shares of the company that they govern. Both situations are problematic. Excessive executive option issuance: Ironically, the largest option grants tend to go to entrenched insiders that don’t need a payment to stay. As the interests of insiders and shareholders are clearly opposed in these cases, it is important that shareholders aggressively oppose excessive option issuance. Bundled voting: The sole purpose of bundling director elections is to reduce shareholder influence. The practice is gaining traction in Brazil, and we are actively opposing the trend. Stakeholder Capitalism: A theory typically used by boards to advance liberal environmental and social agendas that are at odds with shareholder interests. The resulting extreme ESG commitments can be both costly and morally objectionable. Poison Pill Adoption: While there are valid reasons to adopt a poison pill, most of the time they are used to further entrench management and boards and should be opposed by shareholders. Change of control payouts: An egregious practice of paying insiders an additional bonus to sell the company. Such payments are indefensible and the wrong way to address the problem of entrenched insiders. Corporate governance engagement is an art that goes well beyond the application of a set of rules. We don’t vote against every flawed director or proposal. Instead, we seek to explain to board members why we oppose certain practices and expect a good faith effort from them to address our concerns. We aim for improvements, not perfection. Corporate Governance Insights Applied The CEOs of Torex Gold Resources and B2Gold both announced their resignations in February of this year with gold trading north of $5,000 per ounce and gold mining equities indices hitting new highs. At both companies, the boards decided to promote the CFO to the open CEO role. In our opinion, these decisions reflect the boards’ intentions to prioritize the return of capital over growth strategies. Given the low valuations at which Torex and B2Gold currently trade, returning capital via share buybacks is especially accretive today. Accordingly, in both cases, the surprising leadership change made the companies more attractive investments, and we have been active buyers of both in recent months. Torex Gold Resources On February 4th, Jody Kuzenko, Torex’s CEO, announced her resignation. Given that Jody is 56 years old, the market was surprised by her unexpected departure, and Torex’s shares gapped down -12% on the news. If everything were fine, why would Jody leave the company she worked so hard to build over the previous decade? As long-term investors in Torex, we were in a great position to form our own opinion about Jody’s departure. Our conversations revealed two important things: First, Jody’s departure was a result of her sincere desire to take her career in a different direction and not the result of a problem at Torex. Secondly, Torex is going to generate an enormous amount of free cash flow, most of which will not be reinvested in mining activities, and Andrew Snowden, Torex’s CFO, is the right person to manage the capital return program. B2Gold On February 24th, Clive Johnson announced his resignation as the CEO of B2Gold. Given he was 73 years old, his retirement was not as surprising. Clive was a gifted CEO but not a fan of returning capital to shareholders through dividends or buybacks. Accordingly, his resignation drove B2Gold up 13% over two trading days. In our opinion, the stock market was rightly concerned that Clive would always push to build or buy another mine. Clive’s departure and the elevation of Mike Cinnamond, the CFO, provides clarity on B2Gold’s capital allocation framework going forward. The company is clearly focused on “per-share” value creation, which has resulted in increased share buybacks and dividends. Conclusion In both cases, the boards of Torex and B2Gold are prioritizing shareholder value over the “growth at any cost” mentality that has plagued the mining sector for decades. Our corporate governance engagement with these two companies provided us with a front-row seat to this important change that has not been fully appreciated by the market. Organizational Update In May, we added Roman Fuzaylov to our investment team. Roman has 20 years of experience as an investor across frontier and emerging markets. He started his career as a junior analyst at Prince Street Capital in 2006 and eventually became a partner and portfolio manager of their Tamerlane Fund, a regional mandate focused on Emerging Europe, Middle East and Africa. More recently, he was a co-portfolio manager of the Helios Seven Rivers Fund, a joint venture with Helios Investment Partners that focused on public markets investing across the African continent. Roman originally hails from Uzbekistan, is fluent in Russian, and is very well aligned with our long-term, fundamental approach to investing. In April, we hired Luca Grandinetti as a junior operations analyst. In addition to providing versatile support across our operations and middle-office functions, Luca has been instrumental in our Firm-wide efforts to centralize and organize the data around portfolio company corporate governance during proxy season. Prior to joining us, Luca worked at the Mitsui Group and Mirador, Inc.
By Kieran Brennan • July 20, 2026
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. declined (-12.4%) net of fees in the second quarter of 2026, finishing the first half of the year up +15.8%. During the second quarter, the S&P 500 index appreciated +15.2% and is up +10.2% through the first half of the year. Equinox’s poor performance for the quarter was driven by declines in both our mining and energy equities. Corporate Governance Corporate governance analysis is central to our research process. We view our long-term investments in publicly traded companies as partnerships with a company’s board of directors. Accordingly, we don't just want to know what decisions a board is making; we know why a board is making decisions. In our opinion, understanding a board’s motivation is the best way to gain durable insight into their corporate strategy and capital allocation policy. Our emphasis on corporate governance has helped us avoid value traps and understand our portfolio companies better. Active engagement is more than informed proxy voting. Active engagement entails a sincere dialogue with directors. While the relationships required for an honest back and forth are not easy to achieve, conversations with directors have become a real differentiator for our research process. Our corporate governance successes have added meaningful value, and our corporate governance failures have taught us important lessons. While each governance situation is unique, we face several recurring problems of note: Non-aligned directors: A surprising number of public company directors own little to no stock. These non-aligned directors fall into two categories: directors who lack sufficient wealth to own a meaningful amount of stock, and wealthy directors who choose not to own shares of the company that they govern. Both situations are problematic. Excessive executive option issuance: Ironically, the largest option grants tend to go to entrenched insiders that don’t need a payment to stay. As the interests of insiders and shareholders are clearly opposed in these cases, it is important that shareholders aggressively oppose excessive option issuance. Bundled voting: The sole purpose of bundling director elections is to reduce shareholder influence. The practice is gaining traction in Brazil, and we are actively opposing the trend. Stakeholder Capitalism: A theory typically used by boards to advance liberal environmental and social agendas that are at odds with shareholder interests. The resulting extreme ESG commitments can be both costly and morally objectionable. Poison Pill Adoption: While there are valid reasons to adopt a poison pill, most of the time they are used to further entrench management and boards and should be opposed by shareholders. Change of control payouts: An egregious practice of paying insiders an additional bonus to sell the company. Such payments are indefensible and the wrong way to address the problem of entrenched insiders. Corporate governance engagement is an art that goes well beyond the application of a set of rules. We don’t vote against every flawed director or proposal. Instead, we seek to explain to board members why we oppose certain practices and expect a good faith effort from them to address our concerns. We aim for improvements, not perfection. OPEC's Last Stand The Equinox Partners upstream oil investments are great at $80 oil, good at $70 oil and reasonable at $60 oil. The 40% portfolio weighting in oil equities reflects our conviction that oil prices will be closer to $80 than $60. Our view incorporates the natural oil supply-demand balance as well as our confidence that this supply demand balance is not solely determined by market forces. Chief amongst those non-market forces is OPEC, an organization that we believe will fight to stay relevant. OPEC’s operating premise is that small changes in oil supply drive much larger changes in the oil price. Therefore, oil exporting countries should modestly restrict oil supply to maximize their revenues. China and America’s active management of the oil market in recent years poses a serious challenge to OPEC’s influence. Having successfully suppressed the oil price with a series of market interventions, America and China have no intention of retreating to a passive approach and hoping for the best. OPEC now faces a stark choice: prevent America and China from rebuilding their oil inventories or become irrelevant. Coordinated interventions intended to manage down the price of oil are nothing new. Oil importing countries launched the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974 to do exactly this in the wake of the 1972-1973 Arab oil embargo. Since then, the IEA has formally coordinated oil importing countries’ response to oil market disruptions and OPEC’s oil price manipulation. IEA members, like OPEC members, make certain commitments. Specifically, IEA member countries must maintain 90 days of oil inventory and have a demand restraint program capable of reducing national oil consumption by up to 10%. These commitments enable the IEA to coordinate inventory releases and suppress demand during a crisis such as an oil embargo or war in the Persian Gulf. Absent a crisis, the IEA relies on soft power to contain oil prices. The organization promotes oil alternatives, warns about climate change, and makes pessimistic projections about future oil demand. The IEA has not, however, coordinated direct oil price suppression as a regular course of business. During his first term, Trump followed the historic norms for IEA member countries. When he wanted the oil price down in 2018, he turned to OPEC, not the IEA. Trump famously telephoned Saudi’s crown prince, MBS, asking him to produce more oil. We don’t know exactly what concessions Saudi’s crown prince secured in exchange for the additional oil supply but, presumably, Saudi assistance came at some cost. The Biden administration, perhaps because of its poor relationship with Saudi Arabia, took a more aggressive approach to the oil market, and released 50 million barrels from America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 2021. Biden didn’t seek Congressional authorization for this release, claiming he was just swapping current barrels for future ones. A sleight of hand for sure, but one that recognized America’s new status as a net oil exporter. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Biden was free to take additional measures. He declared an emergency and released an additional 180 million barrels from America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve, promising to eventually replenish the oil stockpiles he sold, which he only partially did. Once Biden proved that oil price could be influenced through active inventory management, his strategy was certain to be copied. The Iran war offered America and China an opportunity to do exactly that. The US and China have released hundreds of millions of barrels of oil and refined product into the market since the start of the war with Iran. Beyond inventory sales, Trump has constantly talked down the oil price, promised a plunge in oil prices when the war ends, and encouraged additional oil production from Venezuela. The Chinese have taken even bolder action, cutting their domestic demand by millions of barrels a day. While it is impossible to know how much of the Chinese demand reduction is actual demand suppression and how much of it is Chinese inventory sales, the estimated 3-5 million barrel a day decrease in Chinese oil demand since the Iran war started has helped keep a lid on oil prices. While there is no formal coordination between the US and China, the shared interest is clear. Both countries are highly indebted and want low oil prices to contain inflation expectations and domestic interest rates. Combined, the US and China have $45 trillion in federal government debt and another $80+ trillion in private sector debt. A little oil price manipulation probably seems like a small price to pay for the lower financing cost of debt. Low oil prices also serve America and China’s geopolitical interest vis-a-vis Russia. From the US perspective, low oil prices make Russia more likely to do a deal in Ukraine. From the Chinese perspective, low oil prices make Russia more dependent on China. In both cases, American and China clearly believe their geopolitical interests are served by lower oil prices. OPEC has long worried that large oil inventories in oil importing countries could be used to blunt OPEC’s influence over the oil price. America and China’s actions confirm that fear. OPEC is losing members, losing power, and now has a very difficult task ahead: if OPEC wants to stay relevant, OPEC must prevent America and China from restocking their inventories when the straits of Hormuz reopen. This will require carefully managed OPEC oil production and tough conversations with China and America. If OPEC succeeds in reasserting their position in the oil market, the oil market won’t get the full benefit of short-term oil restocking in the US and China. But, longer-term, OPEC’s relevance should ensure oil prices of at least $80. If, on the other hand, OPEC doesn’t reassert itself, China and America will restock their oil inventories quickly, which is short-term oil bullish. Then, China and America will use their excess oil inventories to manage down the oil price, which is long-term bearish.
By Kieran Brennan • July 15, 2026
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund was up +3.5%, net of all fees, in the second quarter of 2026, and finished the first half of 2026 up +32.0%. By comparison, the MSCI Emerging Markets Index returned +24.2% in the quarter and finished up +24.0% for the first half of the year. The MSCI Frontier Markets Index was up +11.2% in the second quarter and up +10.2% for the first half of 2026. Performance in the second quarter was led by strong returns of Guaranty Trust, MTN Ghana, and UAC Nigeria, the last of which we will discuss in greater detail in this letter. These significant gains in our largest African equity holdings were partially offset by the pullback in several of our energy sector holdings. Our portfolio also suffered from the continued sell-off in the Brazilian equity market. We are using this weakness as an opportunity to deploy capital countercyclically into a handful of world-class businesses. Revisiting UAC Nigeria We recently returned from a trip to Nigeria and Ghana where we visited the management teams of several of Kuroto Fund’s long-term investments. One of those investments, United Africa Company of Nigeria (UACN), has appreciated significantly, entering the top 5 by position size for the first time. Given the meaningful contribution to return and large position size, we thought it would be timely to review the investment and learnings from our latest site visit. In the 1920s and 1930s, Lever Brothers Limited established the United Africa Company to facilitate trade in the region, mainly supplying palm oil for their soap operations. In 1974, the Nigerian subsidiary UACN became one of the first publicly listed stocks in the country. Today, it is one of the premier Nigerian companies with an iconic headquarters in Lagos. In the 1990s, Lever Brothers Limited, now known as Unilever, fully exited its shares and UACN diversified into several unrelated businesses, including property development, snack foods (sausage rolls and ice cream), paint, animal feeds, restaurants, and logistics.
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