Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q3 2012 Letter

Dear Partners and Friends,

PERFORMANCE & PORTFOLIO

Kuroto Fund rose +10.1% in the quarter ended September 30, 2012. After gains in October and in November, the fund was up +19.6% for the year to date through November 30th. This compares to the MSCI Asia Pacific index which was up +12.7% during the same period.

JAPAN'S NEW RADICALS

A government persistently spending almost twice what it collects in tax receipts perfectly instantiates Herb Stein’s famous law: “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Mindful that this is the perennial Western reaction to so much of what goes on in Japan, Kuroto undertook a study of the many levers the Japanese government can pull in order to continue postponing an eventual day of reckoning. 


First amongst these levers are Japanese Government Bond (JGB) purchases by the parastatals— public pension funds and other quasi-government entities. While this had been an effective strategy for more than a decade, in recent years these parastatals have begun shrinking their balance sheets as Japan’s savings rate has declined with its aging population; they became sellers rather than buyers of JGBs. As a result of this change, the Japanese government began to lean more heavily on Japanese commercial banks to buy its bonds. In defending the 22% of his bank’s balance sheet currently invested in government bonds[1], the CEO of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi could only offer that, “...we need to be responsible to keep that market in order.”[2]

More recently, as bank balance sheets have become increasingly laden with JGBs, a new, price-insensitive buyer was needed. Fortunately, the heretofore reluctant Bank of Japan (BOJ) has become a convert to monetary quantitative easing. Despite its vehement denials of “deficit monetization,” the fact is that Japan’s central bank has purchased 32% of all net JGB issuance in 2011 and 109% in the first six months of the current fiscal year 2012.

FY 2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 6MONTHS
JGBs outstanding 671 674 684 680 720 759 789 804
net change 4 10 (4) 40 38 31 14
BoJ JGB Holdings 93 76 67 64 73 77 87 103
net change (17) (9) (3) 9 4 10 16
% of JGBs purchased by BoJ -475% -89% 81% 22% 11% 32% 109%

Interestingly, rather than gloss over their central bank’s balance sheet expansion—as America’s leaders have—Japanese politicians are demanding even more. The current Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, has openly embraced further easing. Moreover, Shinzo Abe, head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the lead contender to replace Mr. Noda, has been even more aggressive, declaring that, “we should set an inflation target and print unlimited Yen until we reach that target.” [3] To hammer home this point, Mr. Abe has promised to work closely together with the BOJ governor to achieve this target.


This fervent easy money rhetoric strikes us as more than just an effort to secure a reliable buyer for JGBs or to talk the Yen lower. It seems instead to be an effort to blunt the nascent movement in Japan for real political reform, a movement that is gaining momentum as the Japanese economy enters its third decade of listless growth.


If Japan’s economy suffers from sclerosis, the only word that describes its politics is stasis. The LDP has had one of the longest runs in power of any political party anywhere in the democratic world. Since its inception in 1955 until 2009, the LDP was in power for all but 11 months of those 54 years. Even the 2009 electoral win by the Democratic Party of Japan—the main opposition party—did not create any real change in the country, as their policies have ended up being very similar to those of the LDP. 


A major reason for this lack of change in the face of decades of economic deterioration is due to the fact that the real reins of power in Japan are held by the unelected bureaucracy. Under the LDP’s long post-war tenure, the Japanese bureaucracy arrogated enormous powers to itself. With most Japanese legislation and all budgets originating in the Japanese bureaucracy, the bureaucracy has far more power than the politicians in most policy debates. Needless to say, the bureaucrats are loathe to allow bureaucratic reform which is exactly what the newly created Japan Restoration Party (JRP) is proposing. It is against this political backdrop that inflation targeting—a change that won’t force the Japanese elite to amend their ways—has gained such political support from bureaucrats and politicians alike.

Over the last few months, this cozy political party duopoly overseen by the powerful bureaucracy has witnessed the development of a serious reformist threat from the JRP founded by Toru Hashimoto. When it comes to dealing with the bureaucracy, Mr. Hashimoto, the youthful leader of the JRP and current Mayor of Osaka, has made his agenda clear. In his current position, he has cut public sector pay and forced performance requirements on school teachers. The JRP manifesto for the upcoming election even calls for a “Great Reset” of Japan’s existing social system. They want to change from a centralized power-state model to a regionalized power-state model, extend nationwide the civil service reforms implemented in Osaka, abolish the Diet Upper House, and allow the popular election of the Prime Minister. 

In response to this unwelcome political threat, the long-established elite’s views on proper monetary policy have taken a radical turn. This shift is as evident in the bureaucrats as in the politicians. For example, the four leading candidates vying to replace BOJ Governor Masaaki Shirakawa have each championed inflation targeting, and Mr. Abe, the likely winner of Sunday’s election, has floated the idea of formally changing the BOJ’s statutory mandate.


Importantly, the election will not prove to be the high-water mark of Japan’s inflation targeting as we think that Mr. Abe and the BOJ will actually follow through with their attempt to create inflation. This represents a substantial departure from the past twenty years of Japanese economic history, and should represent a propitious time to be short overpriced Japanese government debt.


Japan’s decision to aggressively ease on the back of expansionary fiscal policy raises the ultimate probability of both falling bond prices and a weakening Yen. Both seem likely to us, but we continue to believe the bond market offers the superior short opportunity due to the asymmetry of shorting low-yielding bonds. Accordingly, we’ve maintained our outsized short exposure to Japanese government debt via interest rate swaps and low-priced swaptions.



Sincerely,


Sean Fieler                   

Daniel Gittes

William W. Strong 

ENDNOTES

[1] Bank JGB bond exposure taken from Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Q2 2012 Report.


[2] Patrick Jenkins and Michiyo Nakamoto, Japan bank chief warns on bond exposure, Financial Times, December 2, 2012.  


[3] Alexander Martin, Japan Opposition Leader Ups Pressure on Central Bank, Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2012.

Precious Metals Fund - Q2 2025 Letter

By Kieran Brennan • August 1, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. rose +13.2% in the second quarter of 2025 and is up +39.7% for the first half of 2025. By comparison, the Junior Gold Mining Index GDXJ rose +18.7% in the quarter and is up +58.7% for the first half of the year. Our meaningful year-to-date underperformance relative to the GDXJ reflects the continued discount at which our companies trade compared to peers. Specifically, our portfolio of producing companies trades at an average internal rate of return (IRR) of 24%, roughly double the 11.5% IRR of the broad universe of gold miners that BMO covers. the gold mining bull market is young The skepticism that characterizes the gold mining sector stands in sharp contrast to the enthusiasm in the broader stock market. The animal spirits that have propelled popular stocks like Wingstop and Robinhood to an average of nearly 80 times 2025 earnings remain totally absent among gold mining investors. One indication of the sober mood that dominates the gold mining sector is the use of gold price assumptions below spot in net asset value (NAV) calculations. Looking at four important sell-side houses for the sector, their models include an average long-term price assumption of $2,400 per ounce, representing a 28% discount to the quarter-end spot price. 

Equinox Partners, L.P. - Q2 2025 Letter

By Kieran Brennan • July 24, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. rose Equinox Partners, L.P. rose +11.6% net of fees in the second quarter and is up +24.1% for the year-to-date 2025. By comparison, the S&P 500 index rebounded +10.9% in the second quarter and is now up +6.2% for the year-to-date 2025. Our portfolio has performed well across the board this year, with our gold miners, oil and gas producers, and emerging market businesses all appreciating. We were particularly gratified by the long-overdue outperformance of several of our earlier stage gold companies in the first half of this year. With markets and complacency on the rise, we think it prudent to address the non-negligible risk of an economic downturn. Beware the Next Recession 

Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q2 2025 Letter

By Kieran Brennan • July 23, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund, L.P. appreciated +21.3% in the second quarter and is up +30.1% for the first half of 2025. By comparison, the broad MSCI Emerging Markets Index rose +12% in the second quarter and is up +15.3% for the first half of 2025. Key performance drivers for the fund have been our large position in MTN Ghana, as well as the strong returns from our holdings in Nigeria and the Republic of Georgia. A breakdown of Kuroto Fund exposures can be found here . Despite Kuroto Fund’s outperformance in the first half of the year, our portfolio remains very attractively valued. Given the diversity of business models we own, it is difficult to find metrics that provide an accurate picture of the value and quality of our portfolio in the aggregate. In the absence of an alternative, our portfolio’s weighted average price-to-earnings multiple of 7.3x 2025 earnings, dividend yield of 5.2% and ROE of 24.7% will have to do.

Precious Metals Fund - Q1 2025 Letter

By Dan Donohue • May 1, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. rose +23.4% in the first quarter of 2025. Over the same period the price of gold rose +18.9%. The fund’s performance was driven by strong returns from both the producing and exploration stage companies as gold crossed $3,000 per ounce. Trump's New Economic Policy Trump’s New Economic Policy has roiled markets and bolstered investor gold buying globally. While the violent market gyrations remain a focus for our team, we have also been thinking through the long-term effects of Trump’s policies. In this latter endeavor, Nixon’s 1971 New Economic Policy has proven an invaluable guide. The policy similarities between Nixon’s first term and Trump’s second are striking. Both presidents declared emergencies, raised tariffs, cut spending, reduced foreign aid, blamed foreigners, devalued the dollar , proposed tax cuts, attacked the Federal Reserve chair, and directly managed consumer prices. There are, of course, also meaningful differences. Most notably, Trump has raised tariffs more, devalued the dollar less, and has not imposed formal wage and price controls. Nevertheless, the policy resonance is striking.

Kuroto Fund, L.P. - Q1 2025 Letter

By Kieran Brennan • April 30, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Kuroto Fund, L.P. appreciated +7.3% in the first quarter of 2025, while the broad MSCI Emerging Markets index rose +3.0%. Kuroto performance for the quarter was driven primarily by the strong performance of our operating companies in Georgia and Ghana. A breakdown of Kuroto Fund exposures can be found here . Returning to Brazil Though the Kuroto Fund didn’t invest outside of Asia until 2014, as a firm we began investing in Brazil in the late 1990s and made our first sizable investment there in 2004. We have followed the market ever since. Given our love for the country of Brazil and admiration for many of the companies there, it has been challenging for us to remain mostly absent from Brazilian capital markets for the past decade. We stayed away for a variety of reasons, but primarily because we didn’t like the valuations on offer. So it is with more than a bit of enthusiasm that we were able to make two substantial investments in Brazil this January, taking our portfolio weighting in the country from 0% to 10%. Brazil remains a macroeconomic and political adventure, but today’s valuations are incredibly attractive. The Brazilian stock market is down over 40% in US dollars over the past 14 years. 

Equinox Partners, L.P. - Q1 2025 Letter

By Kieran Brennan • April 29, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners, L.P. rose +11.0% net of fees in the first quarter of 2025. Over the same period, the S&P 500 index declined -4.3%. Equinox’s performance was driven by the strength of our gold mining equity portfolio, most notably by our earlier stage exploration companies that rose dramatically as gold crossed $3,000 per ounce. Trump's new economic Policy As Trump’s New Economic Policy roiled markets, we selectively harvested short positions and increased our ownership in oil and gas companies at deeply discounted prices. Violent market gyrations remain a focus, but we have also been thinking through the long-term effects of Trump’s policies. In this latter endeavor, Nixon’s 1971 New Economic Policy has proven an invaluable guide. The policy similarities between Nixon’s first term and Trump’s second are striking. Both presidents declared emergencies, raised tariffs, cut spending, reduced foreign aid, blamed foreigners, devalued the dollar, proposed tax cuts, attacked the Federal Reserve chair, and directly managed consumer prices. There are, of course, also meaningful differences. Most notably, Trump has raised tariffs more, devalued the dollar less, and has not imposed formal wage and price controls. Nevertheless, the policy resonance is striking.

Case Study: Solidcore Resources - Webinar Replay

By Kieran Brennan • April 8, 2025
Webinar Replay of Case Study presentation on Solidcore Resources

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By Kieran Brennan • February 26, 2025
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Precious Metals Fund - Q4 2024 Letter

By Kieran Brennan • January 18, 2025
Dear Partners and Friends, PERFORMANCE Equinox Partners Precious Metals Fund, L.P. fell -12.9% in the fourth quarter, finishing the year down – 2.9%. The fund’s performance reflects the lackluster performance of the gold mining sector as well as the underperformance of the companies we own. While there were some clear themes, such as producing companies outperforming exploration companies, our 2024 results are most accurately captured through a description of our six best and six worst performing investments during the year. These twelve companies capture every investment that contributed at least 1%, positive or negative, to our 2024 fund performance. A Challenging Year In 2024, the gold price finished up +27.4%. The GDXJ ETF which tracks the index of junior gold mining producers was up +15.7%. Our portfolio of miners in this fund was down -2.9%. The underperformance of the gold miners as compared to gold largely reflects government participation in the gold market. In 2024, governments bought gold, not gold miners. The poor performance of the gold miners also reflects the sector’s continued subpar returns on capital. The S&P TSX Global Gold universe, a group of large, mature gold miners, only generated an 11% ROE in 2024 and a 5.4% free cash flow yield according to RBC. Despite their inadequate returns on capital, producing miners handily outperformed most exploration and development companies. There remains almost no market for most gold mining companies that are years away from first production. As value investors with contrarian instincts, we have found the increasingly irrational valuations of the pre-revenue companies of particular interest. Often as a project advances, the equity market value of the company declines. These share price declines in turn create a self-reinforcing dynamic in which the small, cash-starved companies underperform because they don’t have access to the capital necessary to move their projects forward. At this point, the downward spiral of pre-revenue gold miners is very extended and nearing a floor in our opinion. Not only are the valuations of these companies incredibly low, but these companies have become increasingly attractive acquisition targets. Although exploration companies are the most severely discounted sector, 54% of our fund remains invested in producing companies. In general, our producing companies trade at a discount to the sector because they are executing on significant capex plans and lack free cash flow. During construction periods, the market can become excessively skeptical. This skepticism, in turn, can present an opportunity to buy high quality assets run by good management teams at attractive valuations. We believe that this is clearly the case at Eldorado Gold, K92 Mining, West African Resources and Adriatic Metals. Overall, our miners are incredibly cheap. Assuming a flat gold price, we estimate our producers will generate a 23.5% IRR. Our companies that do not yet generate any cash flow are cheaper still. Ascot, Thesis, Troilus and Goldquest, for example, have an average IRR of over 30% at current metals prices. Six Winners and Six Losers in 2024 Note: Below IRR is our Equinox internally calculated IRR based on 2024 year-end market prices and forecasted future FCF per share to equity. Borealis Mining: 2024 Performance +29%, IRR 48% Borealis was founded by Kelly Malcolm in 2023 to leverage a large heap leach facility in Nevada by acquiring nearby low-grade heap leach assets. We invested in a pre-IPO round at a $30M post-money valuation. At the time, Borealis had approx. $5M worth of crushed stockpiles, a fully permitted heap leach facility, ~60,000oz of reserves ready to be processed with limited capex and substantial exploration potential at depth. In late 2024, Borealis began to acquire nearby deposits. Borealis purchased Bull Run for $6M in cash. This translates to $14 per ounce for ~500,000oz of already defined resources, and confirms managements intuition that there are small, stranded assets for sale in Nevada. We expect Borealis to continue this acquisition strategy and ramp to become a ~75,000 oz per year producer. K92 Mining: 2024 Performance +22%, IRR 17% K92 controls the world-class Kainantu mine in the highlands of Papua New Guinea. This mine is a high-grade, low-cost asset with a 3 million oz resource at 7g/t. K92 produced 120,000 oz last year, and we expect the company’s Phase 3 expansion will take annual production to over 150,000 oz (gold equivalent) in 2025. While K92 has often struggled to meet its ambitious growth targets, the company has strung together two consecutive quarters of meaningfully higher production with higher than reserve grades. K92 recently expanded the milling capacity which had been a meaningful bottleneck for years. If the company can reach Phase 4, the Kainantu mine’s production will produce ~400,000 oz at a bottom quartile cash cost of <$1000/oz while maintaining a clean balance sheet with minimal leverage. West African Resources: 2024 Performance +38%, IRR 31% In 2024, West African Resources (WAF) remained on-time and on budget in the build of the company’s second mine in Burkina Faso, called Kiaka. Once Kiaka is commissioned in Q3 2025, WAF will be a ~450,000 oz annual producer for the next 10 years. While the construction has proceeded as expected, WAF was adversely impacted by the local content language in Burkina Faso’s new mining code. Rather than pay the resulting mark up in their rental of local equipment, WAF elected to purchase their mining fleet outright. This decision added $150 million to the company’s capital budget and resulted in a July equity raise of the same amount. While we were disappointed with the need for more equity capital, ultimately the raise will accelerate WAF’s buy-back and dividend plans. If the company continues to trade at the current valuation, we expect the board will announce a sizable share repurchase as soon as the company’s debt is repaid. Hochschild Mining: 2024 Performance +96%, IRR 18% Hochschild Mining (HOC) is a proven mine builder with the strategy of reinvesting free cash flow into new projects to grow production. In 2024, we visited their newly commissioned mine in Brazil, called Mara Rosa, which was successfully built on time and on budget. Mara Rosa will deliver a 20%+ project level IRR and highlights HOC's competence in executing medium-size projects in Latin America. We expect the company will be able to repeat this success with another mine in Brazil, the Monte Do Carmo project in the neighboring state of Tocantins. Big picture, HOC is a family-owned business with a goal of producing 500,000 ounces of gold per year by 2030. While we would prefer a return on capital goal rather than a growth target, we appreciate the straight-forward way the company organizes its operations, and we believe the company will not undertake projects with less than a 20% cash on cash IRR. Moreover, unlike many growth miners, when the company reaches their targeted 500,000 ounces of annual production – anticipated for 2030 - we expect HOC to transition to return free cash flow to shareholders. Galiano Gold: 2024 Performance +35%, IRR 29% Galiano has been busily working on a new mine plan which will be released on January 28th. We expect the company’s production guidance will increase as Galiano elects to move forward with the redevelopment of their higher grade Nkran pit. We also expect increased exploration spending in 2025 as the company ramps up work on their newly consolidated land package. We are expecting Galiano to guide to a production target of approx. 250,000 ounces per year by 2027. Even at this higher rate of production, we anticipate the company will be able to more than replace reserves given the prospectivity of the Asankrangwa gold belt in which they operate. While Galiano will have to reinvest the vast majority of its cash flow in growth in 2025 and 2026, the company should become a substantial free cash flow generator beginning in 2027. Solidcore Resources: 2024 Performance +22%, IRR 21% Solidcore, a spin-out from Polymetal, is a new position in our fund. Solidcore is run by CEO Vitaly Nesis, and controlled by Oman’s sovereign wealth fund. The company operates two long-lived mines in Kazakhstan and produces 480,000 ounces of gold annually at a competitive All-In Sustaining Cost (AISC) of $1,300/oz. With an EV/EBITDA multiple of 2.2x, Solidcore trades at an almost 50% discount to its peers. This undervaluation is largely due to the company’s sole listing on the Astana International Exchange in Kazakhstan. We expect Solidcore to generate roughly $400 million in free cash flow per year at current gold prices. In 2025 and 2026, this free cash flow will be invested in a new pressure oxidation autoclave. Beginning in 2027, we anticipate that $100 million USD of the company’s free cash flow will be distributed to shareholders. This prospective dividend along with the company’s plan to re-list on the London Stock Exchange offers two catalysts that should drive a significant re-rating. Orezone Gold: 2024 Performance -30%, IRR 27% While Orezone completed its initial build on time and on budget, the company failed to generate the free cash flow necessary to internally finance the expansion of its operations in Burkina Faso. The company’s reliance on high-cost diesel generators and an unreliable power grid proved particularly problematic. Largely due to higher-than-expected power costs, the midpoint of their AISC guidance increased by $100/oz from last year’s projection of $1,338/oz. Despite the elevated power costs, Orezone successfully closed their financing for the hard rock processing plant in December 2024. This financing will enable Orezone to increase annual production from approx. 120,000 oz in 2024 to ~180,000 oz in 2026. We expect 2025 to be a pivotal year for the company as they will begin to generate sufficient cash to pay down debt and continue building towards their 250,000 oz/year target. We are also encouraged by the company’s ongoing exploration program which has the potential to increase the Bombore’s mine life at higher grades. C3 Metals: 2024 Performance -62% C3 stock declined significantly in 2024 even as the company made significant progress advancing their projects in both Jamaica and Peru. With respect to their Jamaican asset, C3 Metals signed a joint venture agreement with the Stewart family, one of the wealthiest families on the island. C3 is now well-positioned to do a JV deal with a larger international mining company that can finance the costly deep holes necessary to test the porphyry copper deposit’s potential. In Peru, C3 Metals received a permit to access one of its land packages located just 40 kilometers east of MMG’s Las Bambas mine. This permit, which took years to secure, opens the door for further exploration in a proven copper-rich region. With the permit in hand, C3 Metals should be able to bring in a larger partner to drill out the asset. Troilus Gold: 2024 Performance -45%, IRR 35% In May 2024, Troilus submitted its feasibility study to the Canadian government. This new study detailed their plan to develop a 22-year open pit mine that would produce approx. 300,000 oz of gold per year. With current gold prices north of $2,600 and copper hovering around $4, the project will likely move forward. The company has received financial support from a handful of export credit agencies interested in its 10% copper production. Troilus is also in the final stages of submitting the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (“ESIA”), another key milestone as they advance towards construction. Located 300 kilometers north of Chibougamau, Quebec, the Troilus project is a brownfield site in a favorable mining jurisdiction with the potential to become a Top 10 copper gold project in Canada. We are fans of CEO Justin Reid and believe in his ability to permit the project and advance it towards becoming a premier North American copper-gold producer. At a $4/oz equity market cap to gold equivalent ounces in ground ratio, we believe Troilus is one of Canada’s best leveraged investments to rising gold and copper prices. Ascot Resources: 2024 Performance -23%, IRR 38% Ascot Resources put its Premier gold project on care & maintenance in September of 2024. At the time, the company didn’t have enough ore coming from the underground mine to profitably operate the 2,500 tonnes per day mill. To rectify the lack of available ore, the company raised $43 million, extended the term of their debt, and decided to invest in an additional 2,500 meters of development before commissioning the mill. The board then made a change at CEO and brought in Jim Currie for his extensive underground mining experience and added our own Coille Van Alphen to the board. Underground development is currently underway, and we expect the mill to restart in Q2 2025. One more injection of capital will likely be required to ensure the company has a sufficient working capital buffer as they restart the mill. When the mine reaches commercial production, it will be able to generate a sustainable ~$100m of FCF per year which should translate into a stock price of at least $1 CAD per share. Great Pacific Gold: 2024 Performance -47% Great Pacific owns two highly prospective gold exploration projects in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Over the course of 2024, the company refined its exploration targets and drilled 5000m at its Kesar project in the highlands of PNG. The Kesar project looks to be an extension of nearby K92’s mine, and as such may be sold to K92. Great Pacific will begin drilling exploration targets at its second PNG property in Q2 of 2025. This property is a brownfield site with past production at a grade of more than 10 g/t. Great Pacific has a third asset in Australia, which we believe could be sold to fund the company’s exploration activities in PNG. Great Pacific is led by an excellent CEO in Greg McCunn. We got to know Greg through a previous investment in West Africa. As CEO, he brings the necessary vision, discipline, and accountability to an exploration company. We believe the company will deliver exploration success at their two PNG assets and ultimately enable Greg to create shareholder value in a variety of ways. GoGold Resources: 2024 Performance -24%, IRR 30% GoGold has been waiting two years for its permit in Mexico. The delay was caused by the previous Mexican President Andres Manual Lopez Obrador’s (AMLO) staunch opposition to new mining development. In the end, while neither of AMLO’s major proposed changes to the mining code passed, few mining permits of any kind were issued during his time in office. GoGold’s large cash buffer and existing heap leach operation enabled the company to wait out AMLO without needing to raise additional equity capital. We think their patience will soon be rewarded as the new administration of President Claudia Sheinbaum plans to process permit applications on their technical merits. In GoGold’s case, the technical merits of their Los Ricos South project are exceptionally strong with over 100 million oz of silver at an average grade of 276 g/t. Sincerely, Equinox Partners Investment Management
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